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CHOOSING HOW TO REGULATE
Andrew P Morriss*
Bruce Yandle-
Andrew Dorchak*
In this Article, the authors survey how agencies create substantive regula-
tions through traditional rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking and litigation.
Using public choice analysis, the Article relates agency choice to the agency's
incentive structure. The Article also shows how the different forms of regula-
tory activity influence the content of agency regulations. Using a case study
of EPA's regulation of heavy-duty diesel engines, the Article examines EPA's
choices over thirty years as a means of testing the proposed theory. Finally,
the Article concludes with a critique of allowing agencies to choose how they
will regulate because the choice allows agencies to evade constraints imposed
by Congress and the President and so diminishes political accountability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the 1980s, administrative agencies in the United States carried
out their regulatory duties almost entirely through rulemaking. Agencies
issued written regulations that informed regulated entities how to conduct
various aspects of their businesses.' Agencies created these regulations
through a variety of processes2 as dictated by individual statutes, but the
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'We use the term "regulation-by-rulemaking" to mean the kind of regulation that is
associated with official notices of rulemaking, public comments, and final notices of rules.
This is typically associated at the federal level with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551-559, 701-706 (2000) ("APA"). Thus to illustrate below we use examples from
the APA. Some regulatory agencies operate under other procedural requirements. At the state
government level, administrative rulemaking procedures also include elements of notice
and public comment that allow for the rules of due process to be met. See generally Jim
Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 551 (2001) (describing institutional reasons for differences in federal and state
rulemaking).
2 We use informal rulemaking under the APA as the exemplar for regulation-by-rule-
making for two reasons. First, formal rulemaking's high costs made it an unattractive al-
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various forms of the regulation-by-rulemaking process share some im-
portant general characteristics: the regulated entities and other interest
groups have the opportunity to comment on proposals;3 interested parties
may seek judicial review of the agencies' procedural and substantive com-
pliance with the relevant statutory framework as created by the legisla-
ture; and interest groups may seek action by the political branches to alter
the agencies' actions.' While a few agencies, most notably the National
Labor Relations Board, operated through case-by-case adjudication rather
than rulemaking, this was the exception rather than the norm.'
Dissatisfaction with the rulemaking process led to calls for procedural
reforms.6 These reforms "sought not so much to restructure the substance
of regulatory policy, but instead to restructure the institutional environment
of regulatory policymaking."7 In response, starting in the 1980s, two new
means of creating regulations appeared. The first, championed as the solu-
tion to regulatory gridlock resulting from litigation over rules, was negoti-
ated rulemaking.8 In this process agencies, regulated entities, and other
interest groups negotiate the content of the rule to be imposed before the
agency formally begins the rulemaking process. Proponents argued this
would reduce litigation over the content of rules, speed rulemaking, and
produce better rules.9 Although it maintains the usual regulatory process
for formal adoption of the rule, regulation-by-negotiation relies on diverting
at least the main interest groups from the public regulatory process to
negotiations and so significantly alters the process. It substitutes negotia-
tion for an agency-directed process, informal sharing of information for
public comments, and trust for adversarial relations.' 0 Most importantly,
the negotiation process brings the main interest groups touched by a regula-
tion's provisions into direct negotiations with the agency. When this proc-
ess is successful, it can eliminate the public debate over a regulation's sub-
stance.
ternative for both Congress and regulators, making its use rare. See I KENNETH CULP
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 288 (3d ed. 1994). Sec-
ond, it is the most general case, since other forms of rulemaking are statute-specific. The
details of each rulemaking scheme are not critical to our argument, and rulemaking generally
shares the attributes we cite.
3 APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
4 See, e.g., Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000).
1 Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and the
Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 388 (1995) ("The NLRB is unique; alone
among the major federal agencies, the Board makes almost all of its policy through adjudi-
cation rather than rulemaking").
6 Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
Il , 1112 (2002) ("For at least the past twenty years ... some of the most prominent and
persistent calls for regulatory reform have tended to be procedural ones.").7 Id.
8 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
I0 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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The second innovation, regulation-by-litigation, began to be used in the
mid-1990s. In regulation-by-litigation, agencies use enforcement actions
against regulated entities to create new substantive obligations for the regu-
lated." Perhaps the best-known example of this new method of regulation
is the 1998 settlement between the attorneys general of forty-six states and
several major cigarette manufacturers. 2 This settlement specified, among
other things, how the firms would market their products and required
$246 billion in payments, to be funded from future sales, which effectively
served as a massive tax increase on cigarettes. 3 Similarly, in 1998 the major
producers of heavy-duty diesel engines signed a $1 billion settlement with
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which imposed new con-
trols for nitrogen oxide ("NOx") emissions. 4
In both cases regulators obtained substantive provisions through the
settlement that they could not have imposed directly on the regulated. A
tobacco tax increase was outside the scope of the authority of state attor-
neys general to directly impose as well as politically infeasible in many, if
not all, states.' 5 The diesel engine settlement included the imposition of
changes in emission standards that the Clean Air Act ("CAA") barred EPA
from directly imposing. 6
Other recent examples of regulation-by-litigation include EPA's liti-
gation against major refinery operators, 7 electric utilities, 8 and wood prod-
' Private parties also regularly bring suits, seeking to impose substantive limitations on
others. Since private entities have no choice of means (i.e., they cannot issue regulations)
and are not subject to the same incentives as government actors, we do not consider them
in this Article.
1" State attorneys general differ from the federal agencies in many respects, but we use
them to illustrate the point because of the widespread knowledge of the tobacco cases. With
respect to our illustration, the similarities between litigation brought by the state attorneys
general and the federal agencies are sufficient to justify grouping both together. Both types
of suits are brought by government agencies as an alternative method of imposing substan-
tive constraints rather than more traditional forms of resolution. The differences lie more
in the incentives that determine which suits will be brought.
"3 See National Association of Attorneys General, Master Settlement Agreement at 14-36
(describing restrictions on defendants' behavior agreed to as part of the settlement), at http://
www.naag.org/upload/1032468605-cigmsa.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review).
14 See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Regulation by
Litigation: EPA 's Regulation of Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 403 (2004).
15 See infra note 151.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661 (2004). See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
17 See J. Hill, Consider New Refinery Compliance Standards Now Being Set Through
Litigation Actions, HYDROCARBON PROCESSING, Aug. 1, 2002, at 2002 WL 18661916 76
(2002) ("Recently, enforcement actions against several petroleum refiners have made them
subject to additional standards and regulatory supervision without the typical rule-making
process."). See also Steve Cook, Settlement with Arkansas Company Expected to Reduce
Emissions by 1,380 Tons, 34 Env't Rep. (BNA) 585, 585-86 (Mar. 14, 2003) (noting set-
tlement in which firm agreed to pay a $348,000 civil penalty and "install state-of-art emis-
sions controls over the next eight years" including a device "so new that [the company]
will be one of the first refineries in the country [to] use it").
"8 See US, Power Plant Settle Up, OIL DAILY, Nov. 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL
23420173 (noting suits against seventeen utilities).
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ucts firms.' 9 New York Attorney General Elliott Spitzer is also fast becoming
a major regulator through litigation, with suits against a wide range of finan-
cial industry entities. 21 In each case, the firms involved have both paid or
expect to pay huge fines and accepted new substantive restrictions on their
conduct as part of a settlement of litigation.2 This means of regulation had
become so prominent that former Labor Secretary Robert Reich concluded
in 1999 that "Regulation is out, litigation is in ... [T]he era of big gov-
ernment may be over, but the era of regulation through litigation has just
begun. 22
Like regulation-by-negotiation, regulation-by-litigation substitutes quite
different procedures for the processes followed in regulation-by-rulemaking.
In regulation-by-litigation, litigation replaces notice and comment proce-
dures; a complaint in a legal action replaces a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing; courtroom proceedings and closed settlement negotiations replace a
public administrative proceeding; the rules of evidence replace the open
rulemaking record; and a limited list of parties largely chosen by the agency
replaces open access public participation. Regulation-by-litigation alters
the function of the courts in appellate review of agency action, substitut-
ing review of the terms of a settlement for a review of the agency's com-
pliance with the substantive law the agency is charged with enforcing. This
can eliminate important benefits from judicial review of agency action.2 3
For example, Professor Cass Sunstein has recently suggested that judicial
review of agency action under the CAA could force EPA to provide greater
quantification of benefits and costs "to ensure that the government ad-
dresses the large pollution problems and does not spend significant re-
sources on the small ones. '2 4 Regulation-by-litigation also eliminates chal-
lenges to the agency's compliance with the APA as a basis for review.
19 See Brent Hunsberger, Boise Cascade Will Settle Suit with Government Over Clean
Air Act, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 17180641
(noting settlements with five wood products companies).
20 See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, SEC, Spitzer Sue Mutual Fund Firm, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,
2004, at E4 (describing suits against mutual fund firms); Jeff Leeds, Spitzer's List for Scru-
tiny Said to Include Record Labels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at CI (describing investiga-
tion of record labels); Floyd Norris, When Spitzer Speaks, Insurers Take Note, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2004, at CI (describing Spitzer investigation of insurance companies).
21 See Hunsberger, supra note 19 (noting fines from $1.3 million to $11 million and re-
quired environmental spending up to $17.9 million for wood products firms); Hill, supra
note 17 (noting up to $600 million per individual refinery in additional costs); US, Power
Plant Settle Up, supra note 18 (noting $1.2 billion spending required under settlement with
a single utility). Of course, these estimates may overstate the impact, since it is in EPA's inter-
est to announce as large a fine as possible, and settlements routinely include spending on
mitigation efforts that are not the result of new regulatory requirements.
22 Robert B. Reich, Regulation is Out, Litigation is In, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
ONLINE, at http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/1999/02/reich-r-02-11 .html (Feb. 11, 1999)
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
23 See Coglianese, supra note 6, at 1125-28 (summarizing the literature on the benefits
and costs of judicial review).
2 4 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PRO-
TECTION (2002).
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As a result of both of these innovations in the process that creates
rules, public participation is limited, oversight of agency action by Congressis reduced, and agencies can operate outside the statutory restrictions im-posed upon them by Congress. Both regulation-by-negotiation and regu-lation-by-litigation are thus a means of imposing substantive regulatoryprovisions on regulated entities with significantly lessened public participa-
tion and greatly reduced checks and balances.25
In this Article we use public choice26 concepts to describe and analyze
the rise of regulation-by-negotiation and regulation-by-litigation as alter-
natives to regulation-by-rulemaking. We offer what we believe is the first
attempt to provide a theory for explaining agency choice of the means of
regulating. We conclude that both, but particularly regulation-by-litigation,
are major new forms of government action that offer significant advantages
to politicians and regulators in particular situations. Regulation-by-negotia-
tion failed to live up to its proponents' initial enthusiastic predictions but
nonetheless provides agencies with significant advantages in situations
where the substance of the regulation requires the credible transmission
of information between the regulated entities and other interest groups, and
where the agency's preference for a particular substantive outcome is weak.Regulation-by-litigation offers agencies opportunities to obtain substantive
outcomes they are barred from imposing directly by constraints createdby legislatures. For example, regulators can escape substantive limits ontheir powers imposed by legislatures by incorporating the forbidden rules
in settlement agreements.
Both are possible only under particular circumstances. Regulation-by-negotiation requires a relatively high degree of shared interest among
the groups participating, the existence of gains from trade to allow par-ties to compromise, and a willingness by interest groups to reject the role
of spoiler. Regulation-by-litigation is possible only when agencies face a
concentrated industry, which allows litigation against individual firms to
effectively substitute for a regulation binding on an entire industry. It also
requires that agencies have some leverage against the firms involved, to
25 See W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1, 1 (W. KipViscusi ed., 2002) [hereinafter "Viscusi, Overview"] ("The policies that result from litiga-tion almost invariably involve less public input and accountability than government regula-
tion.").
26 Public choice analysis is the application of economic analysis to political choices. Itwas pioneered by Nobel economics laureate James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. Seegenerally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).For a survey of public choice analysis, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).Public choice, a sub-discipline of economics, law, and political science, applies economiclogic to collective decision-making. The basic public choice model assumes that ordinaryhuman beings, not angels, populate legislative bodies and regulatory agencies. Accord-ingly, these political decision makers base their decisions on a self-determined benefit-cost
calculus. In short, the political decision maker attempts to maximize his or her wealth orwell-being. Part of this well-being often includes garnering enough votes and campaign
contributions to gain reelection.
20051
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use to induce a settlement and to disrupt cooperation among the firms. Be-
cause of the advantages for bureaucrats and politicians, however, regula-
tion-by-litigation and regulation-by-negotiation are likely to play increas-
ingly important roles in the regulatory landscape in the future unless elected
officials (and their appointees) and courts take action to limit agencies' use
of them.
In the Part II of this Article we describe the means of regulation avail-
able to agencies, focusing on the benefits and costs to the agencies of using
each to provide a unique assessment of the means of regulating. In Part
III we use public choice theory to explain federal agencies' choice of regula-
tory means through an examination of the literature explaining when agen-
cies will choose to act.27 In doing so, we provide the building blocks for a
theory of choice of regulatory instrument, offering an explanation of the
circumstances that encourage the use of regulation-by-litigation and regula-
tion-by-negotiation rather than other regulatory instruments. 8 Part IV
then draws on our recently published regulatory case study of EPA's regula-
tion of heavy-duty diesel engines29 to demonstrate how regulatory choices
are made in the context of a particular set of regulations. Our conclusion
then draws lessons from this analysis and focuses on the problems that
allowing agencies to choose among methods of regulation cause for Con-
gressional control of agency behavior.
II. CHOICE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENT
We define regulation as (1) forward-looking (rather than backward-
looking),3" (2) substantive constraints on (3) private sector actors imposed by
(4) a government actor. This considerably narrows the scope of behavior
to be explained. We think our definition is uncontroversial and only one
point needs elaboration. The first part of our definition limits regulation
to those actions that prescribe the conditions under which particular be-
haviors will be permitted in the future, rather than solely dictating com-
pensation for actions taken in the past. Thus the tobacco lawsuits consti-
tuted regulatory activity since the tobacco products that were the subject
of the suit continue in use and the substantive relief embodied in the set-
tlement addressed future behavior by the tobacco companies.3 By con-
trast, the suits filed in the late 1990s against the lead paint manufacturers
27 For convenience, we refer primarily to federal examples. Our analysis generally ap-
plies to state level regulation as well.
28 Our analysis thus attempts to respond to the call by Prof. Gary Schwartz for taking
regulation-by-negotiation into account in explaining regulation-by-litigation. See Gary T.
Schwartz, Comment, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 348, 350 (W. Kip Viscusi ed.,
2002).
29 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14.
30 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Insurance Effect of Regulation by Litigation, in REGULA-
TION THROUGH LITIGATION 212, 231 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
31 Id.
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over harms from residential uses of their products did not constitute a
regulatory activity, as lead-based paint was no longer permitted for the uses
that gave rise to the litigation. There was thus no forward-looking compo-
nent in the result. We limit our definition to actions intended to alter fu-
ture conduct because it is the claimed superiority of proactive measures
to compensation for actual harms that is used to justify prior restraint in
the first place.
This is not to suggest that requiring payment of compensation for
harm caused does not influence future behavior, just that there is a differ-
ence between the generalized incentive "not to be negligent" provided by
tort law and specific regulatory directives to use particular equipment or
follow particular procedures. Tort law leaves to the private sector the de-
cisions about how much of an activity to engage in and how to reduce the
costs of its behavior, including reducing liability costs. Regulations di-
rect private actors to take specific actions, eliminating or greatly reducing
the discretion they have to make choices. The specific directives were absent
in the lead-paint litigation, taking it out of the regulation-by-litigation
category.32
Legislators and regulators must choose how they will regulate in each
area. Each choice generates political costs and benefits for regulators, and
for the rest of society as well. Agencies have a number of choices of how
to proceed: inaction, rulemaking, negotiation, and litigation. We examine
each to allow us to provide a theory of agency choice among the alterna-
tive means.
A. Agency Inaction
An important benchmark for examining regulation is considering the
alternative of not using administrative agencies to regulate, but leaving a
problem to individuals to resolve through market, contract, and tort insti-
tutions.3 When a government opts to centrally regulate private behavior
2 Of course, damage suits influence future activities; a damage award against a defen-
dant for harming a neighbor's property via air pollution emissions will create an incentive
not to repeat the behavior. See Abraham, supra note 30, at 232 ("Ideally the threat of civil
liability has a regulatory effect by promoting optimal deterrence... ").
33 The use of common law suits by private parties, or by public interest groups acting
on behalf of private parties or communities, to enforce and protect property rights is not
regulation-by-litigation. See, e.g., Roger Bate, Protecting English and Welsh Rivers: The Role
of the Anglers' Conservation Association, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
86 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000) (describing role of private lawsuits
in preserving environmental quality in rivers in the U.K.). These civil suits are an alterna-
tive to legislation and regulation through rulemaking. They are not regulation-by-litigation
because they seek to redress (through compensation) or prevent (through equitable relief)
specific harms done to specific interests, not to address a general problem through gener-
ally applicable rules. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environ-
mental Regulation?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 515-17 (2002) (distinguishing the two ap-
proaches).
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it adds to this mix of market, contract, and tort institutions that would
otherwise govern the behavior of the affected entities through decentral-
ized decision making by individuals. This is important because unregu-
lated outcomes differ systematically from regulated outcomes. For exam-
ple, they are likely to be more heterogeneous than regulated outcomes, as
different individuals opt for different approaches due to the influence of
local knowledge.34 The crucial point for our purposes is that the choice to
address a problem through the government indicates that at least some
people prefer the regulated outcome to the mix of outcomes created by con-
tract, tort and market institutions.
It is important to recognize that we know only that the regulated out-
come is preferable for the decision maker, not that it is socially opti-
mal. While regulatory measures may be imposed because their aggre-
gate benefits to all individuals35 exceed their costs, they also may be im-
posed because particular groups of individuals experience a net benefit
and are able to persuade regulators to act despite the regulations impos-
ing an aggregate net loss.36 Political institutions37 and administrative
14 See generally Friedrich von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON.
REV. 519 (1945) (describing the problem of centralized decision making with dispersed
knowledge).
15 Defining whose interests count is an unresolved issue for centrally imposed regula-
tions. Should Ohio regulators consider the interests of Pennsylvania residents? Should U.S.
regulators consider the interests of Mexican residents? Should human regulators consider
the interests of animals and plants? These issues have been debated for decades with no sign
of a consensus emerging.
36 See J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regu-
latory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEo. L.J. 757, 760 (2003) (noting that "the
most prevalent alleged rule defect" is that "total costs to society exceed total benefits").
37 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). Madison argued that relief from
the ills of faction is "only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects." Madison
suggested that political institutions could be designed to control the problem of factions.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.
It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable
to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a ma-
jority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand,
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the
rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the
danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form
of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the
existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be
prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be ren-
dered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect
schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,
we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an ade-
quate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of indi-
viduals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that
is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
[Vol. 29
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law3" provide tools for attempting to ensure that as many regulatory ac-
tions as possible fall into the former category rather than the latter.3 9
Nonetheless these are imperfect tools and regulatory outcomes may oc-
cur that impose net social losses as well as net social gains. The decision
to regulate and the decision how to regulate must therefore be considered
from the point of view of the decision maker rather than from the point
of view of an omniscient social planner.
Our institutions that constrain decision makers considering imposi-
tion of regulations are not symmetrical with respect to the potential errors of
over- and under-regulation. The decision to regulate is justifiably viewed
with some suspicion because not all collective actions advance the collective
good.' Government decisions about potential regulations therefore require
a legal and political sieve to separate the welfare-enhancing decisions
from the rent-seeking ones.4" The need for this sieve is greatest when the
government chooses to act, as the decision not to act does not carry with it
as great a risk of governmental misbehavior and rent seeking by interest
groups.
Mindful of these risks, lawmakers have subjected agency decisions to
act to a series of procedural and substantive constraints. The APA exempli-
fies the former;4 2 numerous substantive provisions in regulatory statutes em-
body the latter. For example, EPA is restricted in regulating mobile source
emissions by statutory procedural requirements for rulemaking and by the
CAas limit on the substances EPA can regulate,43 the frequency with which
38 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers And Positive Political Theory: The
Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992); Matthew D. McCub-
bins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Ad-
ministrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
39 Prof. Richard Epstein lays out a simple analytical framework to answer this ques-
tion. If one or a small number of people are harmed by an industry's product, then the indi-
viduals harmed have standing to sue. The government need not enter. In contrast, "if the
claims are broad and diffuse, and nobody has a large enough stake to sue, then the [gov-
ernment] can bring action under parens patriae." MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY
RESEARCH, REGULATION BY LITIGATION: THE NEW WAVE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
LITIGATION, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 61 (1999) [hereinafter "NEW WAVE"]. Although
in this Article we are primarily concerned with explaining how agencies choose to regu-
late, given that they have chosen to regulate, we occasionally examine the influence of the
choices of means on the decision to regulate as well as vice versa.
40 We note that defining the "collective good" is also an unresolved problem. Should
regulators act only when they can bring about Pareto improvements? Or does the looser re-
straint of Kaldor-Hicks optimality suffice? Or are actions justified when particularly de-
serving groups or individuals benefit despite net losses overall?
41 Rent seeking is "non-voting, non-criminal actions that are intended to change laws
or administration of laws such that one individual and/or group gains at the same or greater
expense to another individual and/or group." J. PATRICK GUNNING, UNDERSTANDING DE-
MOCRACY 348 (2003), available at http://nomadpress.com/public-choice/ud-16.pdf.42 See William Funk, Bargaining, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1379 (1997) (The APA is "de-
signed to constrain the discretion of agencies through procedural regularity and judicial
oversight").4
1 See, e.g., CAA § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2000) (providing for EPA to add additional
pollutants to list of criteria air pollutants).
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EPA may change the rules, 44 and the unpopularity of the power to impose
use restrictions, which effectively cedes this method to the states.45 At times
those restrictions become binding constraints for agencies, thus making
valuable the existence of alternative methods of regulation with fewer (or
at least different) constraints on the agencies' power. Constraints on agen-
cies are thus primarily intended to prevent errors from improper actions
rather than improper inaction.
Nonetheless, because the regulators' choice of whether or not to regu-
late is not necessarily based on maximizing social welfare, there is the prob-
lem of the holes in the sieve being too small as well as too large. To pre-
vent agencies from incorrectly screening out welfare-enhancing regula-
tory actions there are numerous political checks and balances on agency in-
action. Congress can subject agency inaction to political review as readily
as it can subject agency action to such review. 46 Congress can also require
4For example, EPA cannot issue regulations tightening mobile source emissions stan-
dards without providing a four year lead time for manufacturers. CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a)
(3)(C) (2000). The federal restriction does not, of course, prevent states in nonattainment
areas from adopting California's standards that effectively duplicate EPA's intent. Thus, for
example, when EPA missed the deadline to impose the tighter emissions controls included
in the defeat device settlements (discussed infra at notes 283-305), a coalition of states
representing over forty percent of the market for heavy-duty diesel engines imposed their
own rules. Mobile Sources: Coalition of States Adopts California Rules to Limit Heavy-duty
Diesel Engine Emissions, 3 BNA ENV'T REPORTER 728 (Apr. 5, 2002). Under the lead
time and stability provisions, regulations cannot change for three years after each change
and must be issued four model years ahead of their effective date. CAA, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7521(a)(3)(C) (2000). If EPA issues one change to those regulations, therefore, EPA's
ability to issue additional changes is limited for a time. This happened with respect to die-
sel emissions in 1999. EPA issued model year ("MY") 2004 standards in 1997. They later
sought to add the "not to exceed" provisions to the MY2004 standards, but failed to issue
the regulation in 1999. As a result, EPA could not make the "not to exceed" rules applica-
ble until MY2007, since the MY2004 standards had to remain stable for 3 years. See James
Kennedy, Final EPA Rule on Diesel Truck Emissions Gives Industry Additional lime to Coin-
ply, 31 BNA ENV'T REPORTER 1605, 1605 (Aug. 4, 2000).
In some cases, the restrictions are there to reduce regulatory uncertainty. The lead time
rules were a constraint imposed by Congress to improve the regulatory process. In the auto
industry, for example, Crandell, et al.'s study concluded that "[t]he stringent deadlines and
political maneuvering cannot have been conducive to efficient pollution control. As Con-
gress has shifted deadlines, the companies have not been able to undertake the most efficient
model design and investment plan to achieve the ultimate standards." ROBERT W. CRAN-
DALL, ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 30 (1986).
45 See, e.g., CAA Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2000) (prohibiting states from establishing
emissions standards for mobile sources, with the exception of California, which was allowed
to adopt its own standards because it had an existing regulatory program at the time of the
CAA Amendments of 1970; other states may also adopt California's standards under the
1990 amendments).
46 For example, Prof. Jonathan Cannon describes how Democratic Congresses used their
oversight power to force Republican EPA officials to be more aggressive:
"Beating up on EPA" is a tradition on Capitol Hill. The Agency is within the ju-
risdiction of some 90 congressional committees and subcommittees. Agency officials
appear in hearings before those committees and subcommittees dozens of times
during each Congress, in addition to responding to extensive requests for docu-
ments, submitting congressionally mandated reports, and attending informal meet-
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agency regulatory action47 or simply dictate the substantive rule through
statutory amendments.48 The crucial point is that agencies are politically ac-
countable for decisions not to regulate, even if the legal mechanisms for
forcing agency action are generally more limited than those for restrain-
ing inappropriate agency action.
The primary legal mechanism for forcing agency action is litigation
by interest groups to force the agency to interpret its statute differently.49
Thus those who disagree with an agency's decision not to regulate have
generally been required to turn either to the political branches of government
to force an agency to act or to the courts to seek a change in an agency's in-
terpretation of a regulatory statute." Notable examples of where interest
groups have used litigation against the government to force a reluctant
agency to act include the Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD")
program under the CAA, largely created as a result of the privately initi-
ated litigation that led to a federal district court's decision in Sierra Club
v. Ruckelshaus,5" which in turn forced congressional action, 2 and the regula-
ings with members or congressional staff. The hearings have often been used to
chastise and correct Agency officials.
Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA And Congress (1994-2000): Who's Been Yanking Whose Chain?,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,942, 10,943 (2001).
41 See William F. Pedersen, Contracting with the Regulated for Better Regulations, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 1067, 1086 n.49 (2001) (describing agency-forcing provisions of environ-
mental law).
48 Prof. Richard Lazarus summed up the reauthorizations of the major environmental
laws between 1977 and 1990 as follows: "Each eliminated substantial EPA discretion, im-
posed more deadlines, and included more prescription" with the goal of minimizing "the
possibility of bureaucratic neglect and compromise and of agency capture by regulated
industry." Richard Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Envi-
ronmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 320 & 341.
49 Courts generally grant agencies substantial discretion in determining when to regu-
late. Aside from any formalities involved in rejecting a petition to regulate in a particular
area, agencies need do little when they opt not to regulate. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. &
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 375 (1993) ("For various reasons ... courts
will act only sparingly to compel agency action."). In environmental law, some statutes
have provisions for citizen suits against agencies to force action, although these have led to
considerable confusion in case law over when an agency can be sued for refusing to act.
See Daniel P. Selmi, Jurisdiction to Review Agency Inaction Under Federal Environmental
Law, 72 IND. L.J. 65 (1996).
so Many statutes have action forcing provisions and citizen suit provisions to facilitate
this behavior. See Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Envi-
ronmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 41-51 (2001) (describing use of
environmental citizen suits). The Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Norton v. South-
ern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004), rejected an attempt to force agency
action under the APA, narrowing judicial review of agency inaction.
5'344 F.Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972) aff'd 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and aff'd by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
12 For a history of the PSD issue in the courts and Congress, see Craig N. Oren, Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 10-13 (1988); N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress
and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clear Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643,
664-68 (1977).
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tion of wetlands under the Clean Water Act, where rules were created in
response to privately initiated litigation that led to another federal district
court's decision in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway.53 In
such cases, the legal action changes the substantive constraints imposed on
the agency, which alters the agency's incentives. Regulatory action may
thus occur as a result of the new constraints created by the litigation. This is
not regulatiou-by-litigation, however, as the substantive rules are created
through a separate process chosen by the agency in response to the new
interpretation of the statute created by the litigation. Thus when the Sierra
Club won its case in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, EPA chose to issue regula-
tions creating the PSD program through rulemaking.
We would expect inaction to be the choice of regulatory agencies when
the expected net returns to the agency from action are negative. Agencies
may: fear retribution from interest groups or political figures opposed to
an action; wish to cultivate allies among interest groups for support for
other initiatives through forbearance on a particular issue; or simply have
higher priorities for the agency's limited resources. The PSD and wetlands
cases illustrate how this can occur. In the case of the PSD program, the
CAA was ambiguous5 4 with respect to whether a PSD program was re-
quired.5 Had EPA issued PSD regulations before the court action requir-
ing it to do so, it would have angered powerful congressional figures (those
representing states disadvantaged by the PSD program).56 Thus even if indi-
viduals within EPA wanted to create a PSD program, doing so without
the political cover of a court order would expose the agency to retaliation
from Congress. Similarly, the Clean Water Act was ambiguous on whether
wetlands were covered.57 The federal government had spent decades destroy-
53 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and
the Menace of Mr Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland
Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 25-26 (1999) [hereinafter "Adler, Wetlands"] (describing how
litigation led to rulemaking).
11 We say the statutes were ambiguous because the agency's prior reading was that the
program was not required by the statute while the courts determined that the programs were
required. This could be because the court made an error and read a statute that unambigu-
ously did not require agency action to read agency action. Since we are not trying to explain
the behavior of courts, we will not enter into a debate over whether the courts were correct
in their reading of the statutes. Thus "ambiguous" is a broad term, referring to cases in which
courts read statutes differently from agencies.
11 The ambiguity can be seen from the D.C. Circuit's affirmation of the lower court with-
out an opinion and the Supreme Court's affirmation without opinion of the D.C. Circuit
because it was equally divided. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.Supp. 253 (D.D.C.
1972) aff'd 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). Whether the statute was actually as "ambiguous"
as the courts' behavior indicates is open to question.56 For a discussion of the politics of the PSD issue, see Oren, supra note 52, at 10-13.
Hines notes that EPA had initially given "strong testimony in favor of a federal nondegra-
dation policy" before the 1970 CAA Amendments but later abandoned that position. Hines,
supra note 52, at 663.
17 In the wetlands case, a federal district court ruled that the term "navigable waters"
included wetlands even where they were not navigable. NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp.
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ing wetlands, 58 viewing them as "an obstacle to progress. '59 The internal
structure of the Army Corps of Engineers was thus not set up to reward pro-
tecting wetlands but to reward draining them. In both cases, however, once
the courts had ruled that the programs were required, the agencies' incen-
tive structure changed. Western senators could not punish EPA for creat-
ing a PSD program, and the Corps of Engineers' interest in development
projects was overridden. In both cases, conditions had changed and inac-
tion was no longer the optimal choice from the agencies' points of view.
B. Regulation-by-Rulemaking
Regulation-by-rulemaking typically involves a notice of a proposed
rule, 6° a comment period for any and all parties to express their reactions
to the agency, 6' and a final notice of rulemaking that addresses the com-
ments received from interested parties. 62 In the process, an agency may
hold hearings, and may offer more than one proposed rule before a final
regulation is announced. Of course, there is great diversity in the specific
processes agencies use to create rules through rulemaking, 63 but for our
purposes these differences are less important than the similarities.
The traditional rulemaking process thus at least nominally provides
significant opportunities for public participation. While it is not necessary to
hold a cynical view of agency motives' to wonder whether agencies pay
close attention to the comments they receive during rulemaking, we think
these opportunities have an important substantive impact. We believe
685 (D.D.C. 1975). For a summary of the debate over the reasonableness of this opinion,
see Adler, Wetlands, supra note 53 at 25-26. The Corps declined to appeal and proceeded
to exercise the jurisdiction the district court had granted it. Id. at 25.
'8 See Adler, Wetlands, supra note 53, at 19-20.
9 Kent Jeffreys, Whose Lands Are Wetlands?, J. REG. & SOCIAL COSTS, Mar. 1992, at
35, quoted in Adler, Wetlands, supra note 53, at 20 n. 144.
60 See APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b) (2000) (requiring general notice be published in Fed-
eral Register) and 553(c) (requiring "concise general statement of a basis and purpose" for
rulemaking). See also AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 49, at 51-54 (discussing requirements
for the notice).
61 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) ("[T]he agency shall give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments."); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 49, at 58-62 (describing requirements for rule-
making record).
62 See, e.g., Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 487 F.2d 342
(2d Cir. 1973) (holding that where agency action was challenged in comments on "substan-
tial" grounds the agency "has the burden of offering some reasoned explanation"). See also
AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 49, at 54 ("The courts, therefore, will not credit rulemaking
as 'fully reasoned' unless the agency takes into account the data and critical analysis and
identification of interests and priorities offered by public comment.").
63 See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Nego-
tiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1331 (1997) [hereinafter "Coglianese, Promise and
Performance"] ("[T]he term 'conventional rulemaking' is itself a misnomer because agen-
cies use a wide array of procedures short of negotiated rulemaking for involving the public
in the rulemaking process.").
64 See Funk, supra note 42, at 1384 (criticizing "cynicism of public choice theory").
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there is real benefit to interest groups from participating in rulemaking
because we observe that interest groups regularly invest considerable
resources in ensuring comments are placed in the rulemaking record, in-
cluding both substantive comments65 and simple statements of support for
a particular position.66 By revealed preference, therefore, the value of par-
ticipation to a broad spectrum of interest groups appears to be well estab-
lished: giving us good reason to see value in public participation. In short,
if both environmental pressure groups and pollution sources see value in
willingly spending resources on participating in rulemaking, it seems likely
there is value in the process. That does not prove a net benefit to the pub-
lic as a whole, of course, but it makes the existence of such net benefits
plausible. Moreover, agencies do sometimes learn new information through
rulemaking comments and modify their proposals in response. All this leads
us to believe that there is a net benefit to the public as a whole of allow-
ing public participation in shaping the substance of regulations.
The benefits of such participation need not be direct influence over
the agency. Comments that do not influence an agency directly may influ-
ence political representatives exercising oversight over an agency. Com-
ments are also an important part of the groundwork for attacks on the final
rules through the courts.67 The courts will hold agencies accountable for
addressing important issues raised in comments, as failure to respond to a
substantive comment can itself be grounds for the remand of a rule to the
agency. Since the agencies must respond to comments in their final rules,
even agencies that do not wish to do so must pay at least some attention to
public participation in rulemaking. Traditional rulemaking thus provides
both accessible notice to potentially affected parties and an opportunity
to shape the rulemaking record for political and substantive purposes.
Agency regulatory activity is also subject to political constraints
through appropriations riders, oversight hearings, and other means,68 em-
bedding regulation-by-rulemaking in a broader political context. Michigan
Congressman John Dingell, for example, for years has exerted great influ-
65 See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in
the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & Soc'y RE v. 735, 740 (1996) ("[M]ost [interest] groups
file comments on the rules in which they are involved.").
66 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew Dorchak, Between a Hard
Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations, and Mining, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 551,
590 (2003) (describing campaign to encourage public comments opposing revision of regula-
tion in 2001 which generated over 47,000 messages that simply stated opposition to change
without offering further substance).
67 See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L. 1490, 1492 (1992) (no-
tice and comment is "primarily a method for compiling a record for judicial review");
David Wendel, Comment, Negotiated Rulemaking: An Analysis of the Administrative Issues
and Concerns Associated with Congressional Attempts to Codify a Negotiated Rulemaking
Statute, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 227, 229 (1990) ("[T]he primary means of swaying an agency's deci-
sion in hybrid rulemaking is through the record...").
68 See Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 66, at 555-58 (describing oversight
process).
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ence over EPA's regulatory efforts regarding mobile sources. 69 Account-
ability to the political branches is not perfect,70 of course, but agencies must
take the views of members of Congress and the President into account in
shaping regulations. In particular, required internal executive branch re-
views also contribute significant opportunities "for informational input
and for diverse points of view to be expressed."'" These political constraints
may be used to promote rent seeking rather than the general welfare, as
the Dingell example suggests. Nonetheless, even rent-seeking behavior
may serve a public purpose on occasion. Dingell's relentless advocacy on
behalf of the auto industry has undoubtedly reduced mobile source regu-
lation and so possibly increased air pollution. But it has also protected a
major industry from what may be considered rent-seeking behavior on the
part of other interest groups (e.g., stationary sources and environmental
pressure groups), and so the net effect is not necessarily negative. 72
Judicial review of agency compliance with procedural requirements
and substantive limitations offers an additional set of constraints.73 Once
regulations are final, those affected by them may bring suit against the
61 See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-
Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37 (1998)
(describing Dingell's role in clean air legislation in the 1980s and 1990s); Richard J. Laza-
rus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos
Custodes (Who Shall Watch The Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1991, at 205 (same); John H. Cushman, Jr., Top EPA Official Not Backing Down
on Air Standards, N.Y. TIMES, June I, 1997, at I (describing Dingell's role in slowing acid
rain controls); A. Pytte, Clean Air Stuck in Conference over Automobile Provisions, 48
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3108 (Sep. 29, 1990) (noting that Rep. Dingell, "[c]hairman of the
House Energy Committee, indicated that an agreement would have to be reached on the
motor vehicle portion of the legislation before House conferees would take a serious look
at" the rest of the 1990 CAA Amendments). See also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source
Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL LAW. 309, 373 (2000) (Identifying Dingell as a major player in
the battle over vapor recovery systems between automobile manufacturers and gasoline
retailers). An excellent example of political influence is the inclusion of specific language
concerning diesel emissions in the 1977 amendments to the CAA. Prof. David Currie bor-
rowed a phrase from Justice Frankfurter when he described how the language, although
adding little substantively to the CAA, nevertheless "'expressed a mood' that ought not to
be lost upon administrators and reviewing courts." David P. Currie, The Mobile-Source
Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 850 (1979).
10 Profs. Ruhl and Salzman note that critiques of rulemaking based on "the democratic
deficit of the administrative state" are one of the three major types of such critiques offered
in the legal literature. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36, at 761.
71 W. Kip Viscusi, Tobacco: Regulation and Taxation through Litigation, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 22, 51 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) [hereinafter "Viscusi, Tobacco"].
72 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19 (Michael Greve & Fred Smith eds., 1992) (discussing
Congressman Dingell's efforts to force automobile companies and oil companies to stick
together on air pollution issues).
73 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000) (judicial review pro-
visions). See also AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 49, at 447-49 (overview of APA provi-
sions). Agencies have, in some cases, significant discretion in some matters. See generally
Peter H. Shuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (1990) (describing federal courts' deference to
agency interpretation of organic statutes).
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agency if there is a legal basis for doing so. For example, the agency might
be charged with exceeding its legislative authority7 4 or for adopting a rule
when the scientific rationale for the rule is faulty.75 EPA, in particular, is
regularly sued by interest groups over its regulation-by-rulemaking activi-
ties,76 over allegations that EPA's regulations are too lenient, too strict, or
otherwise violate federal law. As with the political constraints, judicial re-
view is often used to pursue special interest agendas rather than a general-
ized public interest. It nonetheless plays an important part in the balanc-
ing of special interest pressures, keeping agencies to the regulatory bar-
gains struck through the political process.77
The most important characteristics of regulation-by-rulemaking are
thus:
(1) notice to the public of the agency's proposed actions;
(2) creation of a record based on public submissions;
(3) an opportunity for any interested party to comment on the agency's
proposal;
(4) requirement of an agency response to significant comments;
(5) political accountability for agency action; and
(6) judicial review of agency action to ensure procedural requirements are
met and that the agency has followed the substantive law granting it regu-
latory authority.
These combine to provide those affected by regulatory activity with numer-
ous means to exert pressure on agencies. Despite the self-interested na-
ture of many, and even most, of those pressures, the combination helps pre-
vent regulators from singling out particular industries or regions for dis-
14 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding Army Corps of Engineers' definition of navigable
waters under the Clean Water Act exceeded agency's authority under statute).
15 See, e.g., Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding EPA "was relying on pure speculation when it decided" on pollution control stan-
dard). See generally Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm,
and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,371
(2001) (discussing EPA's record on science issues in courts of appeal).
76 Keith Schneider, Who's Making the Rules?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1986, at 7 (quoting
Chris Kirtz, Director of EPA's Regulatory Negotiation Project for fact that "[e]ighty per-
cent of [EPA's] final regulations are litigated" as justification for regulation-by-negotiation
and estimating that regulation-by-rulemaking takes two or more years to create a rule).
GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION 210, 211 (1995) ("[V]irtually every major EPA regulation has been chal-
lenged in federal courts."). But see Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63,
at 1296-1301 (challenging figure that 80% of EPA's rules have been challenged in the
courts).
77 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an In-
terest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 878 (1975) ("The element of stability or
continuity necessary to enable interest-group politics to operate in the legislative arena is
supplied, in the first instance, by the procedural rules of the legislature, and in the second
instance by the existence of an independent judiciary.").
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proportionate burdens.78 Technical flaws in agency analysis can be exposed
through comments, and the open nature of the rulemaking process gives
all interest groups the opportunity to test agency assumptions and analy-
sis. Judicial review prevents agencies from ignoring flaws in their analy-
ses identified by interest groups, and self-interest ensures that interest
groups give agency analyses a hard look. The multiplicity of avenues for
involvement in rulemaking-agency, Congress and courts-ensures that
monopolizing the process is difficult. To be sure, rulemaking has many prob-
lems and the process can be, and often is, captured by special interests de-
spite these checks. Our purpose is merely to show that rulemaking offers
some checks on rent seeking, not that they are sufficient to prevent all rent
seeking. Moreover, despite its imperfections, regulation-by-rulemaking of-
fers features that promote accountability for agency actions. Alternatives
that offer less accountability may therefore be inferior even if regulation-
by-rulemaking itself has serious flaws.
C. Regulation-by-Negotiation
As the result of a number of critiques of regulation-by-rulemaking
during the 1970s and 1980s, 79 regulators established an alternative means
of creating a rule through negotiation among a limited set of interest groups
and regulators, followed by a traditional rulemaking procedure to apply
the resulting rule's provisions generally.8" Although not formalized until
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,"1 and not permanently estab-
lished until the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996,82 regula-
tion-by-negotiation began to be used in the 1980s and has been used since
by a variety of federal agencies."
78 We do not intend to endorse the interest representation view of the administrative
process that relies on interest group participation to constrain agency actions in the absence of
a definable public interest, although our approach does not appear to us to be inconsistent
with that theory. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682-83 (1975) (describing theory).
79 See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J.
I (1982) [hereinafter "Harter, Malaise"]. Regulation-by-negotiation thus has the distinction of
being a procedure based on an academic, theoretical analysis of the problems of rulemaking,
rather than based on existing practices.
80 See Funk, supra note 42, at 135 1 for a thorough and skeptical account of the history
of negotiated rulemaking.
81 Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570
(2000)).
82 Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870, 3873-74 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2000)).
" See Philip J. Harter, Fear of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J.
1389, 1412-14 (1997) (on its use in Clinton Administration) [hereinafter "Harter, Adoles-
cents"]; Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 37-39 (2000) (describing recent use) [hereinafter
"Harter, Assessing"]. The first negotiated rulemaking was done by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration in 1983. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking:
A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 392 (2001) [hereinafter "Coglianese,
Assessing"].
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In regulation-by-negotiation, at least in theory,
the representatives of the interests that would be substantially af-
fected by a rule, including the agency responsible for issuing the
rule, negotiate in good faith to reach consensus on a proposed rule.
The members of the negotiated rulemaking committee determine
what factual information or other data is necessary for them to
make a reasoned decision, develop that information (which often
comes from workgroups comprised of knowledgeable and inter-
ested individuals), analyze the information, examine the legal
and policy issues involved in the regulation, and reach a consen-
sus on the recommendation to make to the agency. As part of the
consensus, each private interest agrees to support the recommenda-
tion and resulting rule to the extent that it reflects the agreement,
and the agency agrees to use the recommendation as the basis of
its action. 4
One study of the process highlighted the establishment of long term rela-
tionships in the negotiation rather than the limited, single contact agency
staff typically has with outsiders in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Sup-
porters and critics of regulation-by-negotiation agree that the crucial in-
stitutional element is the requirement of unanimity in reaching a recom-
mendation.86
The proponents of regulation-by-negotiation claim a wide range of
benefits for it over traditional regulation-by-rulemaking, including: reducing
the time to develop regulations, reducing post-issuance legal challenges to
regulations, and improving the quality of regulations issued.87 Whether or
I Harter, Assessing, supra note 83, at 33 (citations omitted). Formally, the agency de-
termines to use negotiated rulemaking, issues a notice of intent to do so in the Federal
Register and elsewhere, describes the committee to be formed, and invites applications to
join the committee. "The notice serves the important purpose of ensuring that no important
interests are overlooked, and that everyone understands that the decision on the rule will,
at least initially, be made in the committee, and informing interested parties that they need
to come forward." Id. at 35. See also Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory
and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 133 (1985).
85 Clare M. Ryan, Leadership in Collaborative Policy-Making: An Analysis of Agency
Rules in Regulatory Negotiations, 34 POL'Y Sci. 221, 226 (2001).
86 Harter, Assessing, supra note 83, at 34 ("Thus, each participating interest has veto
power over the decision."); Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1334
("The quest for consensus has been the hallmark of negotiated rulemaking.").
17 Philip Harter, an important figure in establishing negotiated rulemaking, summarized its
advantages:
The parties participate directly and immediately in the decision. They share in its
development and concur with it, rather than "participate" by submitting informa-
tion that the decisionmaker considers in reaching the decision. Frequently, those
who participate in the negotiation are closer to the ultimate decisionmaking au-
thority of the interest they represent than traditional intermediaries that represent
the interest in an adversarial proceeding. Thus, participants in negotiations can
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not the process has produced any of these benefits is the subject of con-
siderable debate." The best empirical evidence suggests that regulation-
by-negotiation does not significantly reduce either the time necessary to
create a final rule 9 or the incidence of litigation over final rules.9"
make substantive decisions, rather than acting as experts in the decisionmaking
process. In addition, negotiation can be a less expensive means of decisionmaking
because it reduces the need to engage in defensive research in anticipation of ar-
guments made by adversaries.
Harter, Assessing, supra note 83, at 53 (quoting Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations:
A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 28-29 (1982)).
There is some controversy over exactly what benefits were to flow from regulation-by-
negotiation. Compare Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, with Harter, Assessing, supra note
83. Prof. Coglianese has carefully documented the claims made for negotiated rulemaking,
and we rely on his work here. See Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at
1261-72.
88 See Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1260-61 (contending that
negotiated rulemaking increases the time needed for rulemaking and the number of legal
challenges to rules); Harter, Assessing, supra note 83, at 39-52 (responding to Coglianese);
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip
Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 398-415 (2001) (responding to Harter). See also Funk,
supra note 42 (surveying judicial reaction to negotiated rulemaking); Jody Freeman &
Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 60, 68-71 (2000) (describing debate).
89 See Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1309 ("Negotiated
rulemaking saves no appreciable amount of time ..."); Coglianese, Assessing, supra note
83, at 398-414. Prof. Harter contests Prof. Coglianese's conclusions. See Harter, Assess-
ing, supra note 83, at 40-41 ("Properly understood, negotiated rulemaking has been re-
markably successful in fulfilling its promise. In particular, EPA's experience with reg-neg
has produced a one-third reduction in time..."). Part of the conflict appears to be definitional:
Coglianese counts as negotiated rulemakings instances that Harter does not. The sample
selection issues discussed by Coglianese seem to us to resolve this point in his favor.
10 See Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1286-1309 (reviewing
litigation record of traditional and negotiated rulemaking by EPA and concluding that,
"[a]s a means of reducing litigation, negotiated rulemaking has yet to show any demonstrable
success"). See also Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 416 (finding six of twelve EPA
negotiated rulemakings resulted in legal challenges, "a litigation rate higher than that for
all significant rules under EPA's major statutes and almost twice as high as that for EPA
rules generally"). This somewhat counterintuitive finding is likely due to the creation of
additional issues for litigation, such as exclusion from a negotiating committee. See id. at
427-28. Overall litigation rates for EPA are between 19% and 35% depending on the source of
data and definition of major rule used. Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63,
at 1298-1300 (describing methods of calculating challenge rates). See generally id. at
1296-1309 (reviewing challenges to various EPA rules and disputing widely held figure of
80% of rules challenged).
The most notable defects of rulemaking-by-negotiation in this regard are the introduc-
tion of conflict over the membership of the negotiating committee (which appears to be a
significant problem, with 12% of the respondents in one survey saying that they had to "press"
EPA to allow them to participate), disputes over the meaning of the final agreement, and
disputes over whether the agency has lived up to the final agreement in the subsequent
rulemaking. Id. at 1322-25. As with the conclusions on time saved, Prof. Harter disagrees
with Prof. Coglianese. See Harter, Assessing, supra note 83, at 41 ("no rule that imple-
ments a consensus reached by the committee in which the parties agree not to challenge it
has ever been the subject of a substantive judicial review ..."). As with the time saved
issue, sample selection again is the key to determining who is correct, and Coglianese's ap-
proach is, we think, the more appropriate means of addressing sample selection.
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Critics of regulation-by-negotiation argue that regulation-by-negotiation
has perverse incentive effects for agencies and other participants in the
process, leading to inferior outcomes. These include: selection of issues for
inclusion based on likelihood of success, 91 reduced willingness by par-
ticipants to raise important issues that would hinder reaching consensus, 92
encouragement of ambiguity in rules to foster consensus, 93 heightening "the
sensitivity of the parties to adverse portions of the rule ,' 94 a "lowest-
common-denominator problem" that makes rules less likely to promote
technological innovation, 95 and an incentive to take positions on issues par-
ties consider minor for use in negotiations.96 Critics also find regulation-
by-negotiation to be "inconsistent with the theory and principles of the
APA."97 Professor Cary Coglianese, the leading critic, summarized his con-
clusions about the defects of the process by terming regulation-by-negotia-
tion as "not really even like a house of cards, but rather like the addition
of an extra room to a house with an unsteady foundation. Negotiated rule-
making adds an early attempt at consensus building to a regulatory proc-
ess designed to make it difficult to sustain interest group bargains."98
Regardless of the relative merits of the proponents' and the critics' posi-
tions, negotiated rulemaking presents agencies and outside groups with a
different set of costs and benefits than other forms of rulemaking. Judge
Patricia Wald, for example, concludes that regulation-by-negotiation "re-
stricts, in some measure, through its insistence on face-to-face negotia-
tions, the intrusion of political and extra-substantive considerations at all
levels of rulemaking, agency and White House, and from all sources, identi-
fied and unidentified."9 9 The "precommitment" of the agency is thus, in
Wald's view, the primary benefit of the process for participants, even if
this commitment is not legally enforceable if the agency decides to alter
the proposed rule after the negotiations conclude."0 Other proponents of the
procedure argue agencies use regulation-by-negotiation because of the value
9' Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 439.
92 Id. at 439-40 (describing how during "the equipment leaks negotiated rulemaking
... an EPA official knew industry was overlooking issues related to an entire category of
equipment in developing the rule, but never said a word about it during the negotiations").
91 Id. at 440-41 ("Adopting a vague rule may serve to secure agreement for its own
sake, but doing so can constrain the effectiveness of any resulting public policy.").
94 Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1325.
15 Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 441.
96 Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1331. Indeed, the critics even
argue that alleged advantages, such as the lack of conflict, may play an important role in
creating inferior rules, because "[t]he full articulation of opposing views, even structured
in an adversarial process, may yield more useful information on which to construct public
policy than a truncated discussion between individuals who are. striving to achieve consen-
sus." Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 440.
97 Funk, supra note 42, at 1374.
98 Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1329 (emphasis omitted).
9 Patricia Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE L. 1445, 1471 (1997).
100Id. at 1470.
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of the process. °m Research suggests, however, that "agency staff appear
not to perceive [the purported] benefits as a singularly motivating factor,"' 2
and one study found that "the negotiation process has not been as popular
with EPA employees as it was originally anticipated for resolving crucial
rulemaking problems."'' 3 In addition, in light of the lack of a demonstrated
empirical record of success for the procedure in reducing the time to the
final rule or post-rulemaking litigation, this explanation appears unlikely.
Even when they do adopt regulation-by-negotiation, agencies do not do
so for their most important rules. According to Professor Coglianese's com-
prehensive review: "Agencies have eschewed negotiated rulemaking for
federal rules having the broadest and most substantial impacts on indus-
try and the public."'" 4 Again, this suggests agencies are not choosing regula-
tion-by-negotiation because it is a clearly superior method for rulemak-
ing in general but because of specific advantages in particular cases.
On the cost side, there is good reason to think that regulation-by-
negotiation is often more costly for agencies in terms of their own resources
than regulation-by-rulemaking. In part, this conclusion can be derived
from the hybrid nature of regulation-by-negotiation: agencies must both ne-
gotiate and conduct a traditional notice and comment rulemaking after
the negotiations conclude. Moreover, as Professor Coglianese summarized,
"Whatever one makes of the impact of negotiation on the duration of rule-
makings, there is no disputing that negotiated rulemaking is much more
burdensome, in terms of the overall time and expense, than conventional
rulemaking."'0 5 Only when the reduced effort required for the notice-and-
101 Harter, Assessing, supra note 83, at 38:
Negotiated rulemaking has proven enormously successful in developing agree-
ments in highly polarized situations and has enabled parties to address the best,
most effective, or most efficient way of solving a regulatory controversy. Agen-
cies have therefore turned to it to resolve particularly difficult, contentious issues
that have eluded closure by means of traditional rulemaking procedures.
102 Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1276.
103 Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1276-77 (quoting Brian
Polkington, The Influence of Regulatory Negotiations on the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency as an Institution (1995) (unpublished paper presented at the 1995 American
Political Science Association meeting)).
104 Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 439. The rules chosen for regulation-by-
negotiation
have stood at least a notch below [EPA's] large programmatic rules in terms of their
scope and importance. Each of the negotiated rules has affected only a limited num-
ber of parties, at times just a single industry, precisely as the agency's own guide-
lines suggest. Instead of selecting the most challenging rules, the agency has used
negotiated rulemaking for what an earlier EPA report called "second-tier rules" or
those rules "affecting program implementation-rather than rules establishing
program structure."
Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1319 (footnotes omitted).
105 Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 415. See also Coglianese, Promise and
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comment portion of the process, if any, increased quality of the outcome,
if any, and benefits to the agency, if any, outweigh the added costs of the
negotiations will regulation-by-negotiation be preferred by agencies to
regulation-by-rulemaking.
Agencies choose which regulatory method to apply to each regulatory
proceeding. Rules are "purposely selected [for regulation-by-negotiation] in
most cases by the very same agency managers who conduct or overs[ee] the
rulemaking proceedings."'' 06 Agencies also control which regulations con-
tinue through the negotiated rulemaking process, sometimes pulling regula-
tions back onto the traditional rulemaking track. 07 Agency decisions on
the relative merits of regulation-by-negotiation in particular cases may differ
from those of interest groups. For example, Ellen Siegler, commenting from
an industry viewpoint on the American Petroleum Institute's participation in
two regulation-by-negotiations, concluded that "environmental group par-
ticipants have an advantage" in regulation-by-negotiation over industry par-
ticipants because "they were not required to educate other participants [and
so] did not have to establish their credibility as experts [and] also enjoyed
the advantages of having well-developed negotiating skills and experience
[and] did not have to check back with their constituencies at every turn."'' 08
EPA quickly became one of the most aggressive users of regulation-
by-negotiation, completing twelve negotiated rulemakings through 1996,
a total greater than that of any other agency. °9 As this relatively small
total suggests, regulation-by-negotiation makes up a tiny fraction of all regu-
latory activity-less than one-tenth of one percent of all agency regula-
tions. 0 The record seems clear: Agencies sometimes choose to use regu-
Performance, supra note 63, at 1285 ("by most accounts negotiated rulemaking demands
much more concentrated amounts of time on the part of the agency and non-agency par-
ticipants") and 1286 ("Even those who are otherwise positively inclined toward regulatory
negotiation acknowledge that the process demands a considerable amount of time and re-
sources up-front."); Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 415 ("Even if the overall d-
ration of negotiated rulemakings could be shown to be shorter, the intensity of negotiated
rulemakings still translates into additional time.").
10 Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1312. Prof. Coglianese
made this observation in the course of discussing the problem for his empirical study that
rules were not randomly allocated between methods of rulemaking. He further noted that
"the nonrandom assignment of rules to negotiated rulemaking introduces the possibility
that the rules chosen for negotiated rulemaking were ones that already had either a greater
or lesser need for time, or a greater or lesser propensity to be litigated, at least when com-
pared with the average rule implemented through informal rulemaking." Id.
""7See id. at 1312 n.256 (listing instances of rules EPA withdrew from negotiated
rulemaking).
101 Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations and Other Rulemaking Processes: Strengths
and Weaknesses from an Industry Viewpoint, 46 DUKE L.J. 1429, 1436 (1997). See also
Freeman & Langbein, supra note 88, at 63 (negotiated rulemaking disadvantages "smaller
groups with comparatively fewer resources").
109 See Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 392. See also Ryan, supra note 85, at
225 ("EPA has initiated more negotiation activities than other federal agencies.").
"' See Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1276.
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lation-by-negotiation over regulation-by-rulemaking; they just do not choose
to do so very often.
The scholarly consensus thus is that regulation-by-negotiation is su-
perior only under certain circumstances, even if proponents and critics dis-
agree on how often those circumstances occur. As one government lawyer
put it: "a reg-neg is not used for an average rule. There is usually something
special about it that warrants a reg-neg." ' Identifying these criteria, which
may differ from the criteria the agencies announce as their decision crite-
ria," 2 will tell us a great deal about why agencies sometimes choose regula-
tion-by-negotiation and sometimes do not.
What advantages accrue to an agency from choosing regulation-by-
negotiation over regulation-by-rulemaking? First, agencies receive benefits
based on factors outside the scope of the particular regulatory issue. For
example, agencies could value being perceived by the public, particular
interest groups, or Congress as interested in negotiations. EPA has gone
to some length to encourage the public perception that regulation-by-
negotiation is successful at the agency, including altering which regula-
tions it considered to have been conducted by negotiation to present a more
favorable picture of the process." 3 Second, agencies may need to modify
an existing regulatory structure to accommodate a limited set of special
circumstances, affecting only a small number of regulated entities and other
interests, making regulation-by-negotiation genuinely cheaper to imple-
ment than regulation-by-rulemaking. Third, agencies may need the nego-
tiation process to allow one set of interests to make credible commitments
or disclosures to another set of interests that enable the regulation to be rec-
ognized as a Pareto improvement. The negotiation process itself may, there-
fore, serve as a means for interests to explicitly bargain over the "price"
for agreeing to a new regulatory initiative or changes in rules, allowing a
more explicit deal than would be possible with indirect negotiations through
the notice and comment process."1
" Harter, Assessing, supra note 83, at 45 n.65 (quoting Neil Eisner, Assistant General
Counsel for Regulation and Enforcement, United States Department of Transportation, and
Chair, President's Committee on Negotiated Rulemaking). Even advocates for negotiated
rulemaking, such as Philip Harter, have argued that it should be used only under the cir-
cumstances that improve the likelihood of success. Harter, Malaise, supra note 79, at 31
("Negotiation must be carefully analyzed to determine not only whether it can work at all
in the regulatory context, but also to identify those situations in which it is appropriate.").
'12 See EPA, Negotiated Rulemaking Fact Sheet, at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-
doc/negrefs.htm (Apr. 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
"I See, e.g., Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 403-04 (describing how EPA al-
tered the public list of negotiated rulemakings to remove a particular rulemaking from the
list after Prof. Coglianese published a study critical of EPA's record).
"'4 See, e.g., Beth Foster Hesse, An Update on Negotiated Rulemaking at U.S. EPA, 6
CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 302, 305-06 (1999) ("The negotiation process itself emerges as a
powerful tool for learning what the participants in the process value. Many types of infor-
mation are exchanged. [EPA] believes it is a great regulatory development tool that helps
foster positive relationships among affected parties...").
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An alternative possibility is that agencies were originally mistaken
about the new procedures' costs and benefits. For example, the Reagan
Administration focused on the potential of regulation-by-negotiation to keep
issues out of the courts." 5 After agencies learned how the procedure actu-
ally worked, and after the development of the empirical evidence described
above that called into question the proponents' claimed advantages for
rulemaking-by-negotiation, agencies would then be expected to reduce their
use of the procedure. This explanation is consistent with EPA's sharp drop
off in use of the technique after 1993, t 6 although it does not account for
why agencies chose to select particular rulemakings for regulation-by-
negotiation before changing their view of its value.
In sum, regulation-by-negotiation had an auspicious beginning, with
a wide range of benefits claimed by its proponents based on reasonable
theoretical speculation. Its practice, however, casts some doubt on the bene-
fits' ability to be realized. The key characteristics of regulation-by-negotia-
tion are:
(1) early and continuous negotiation amongst included affected interests
over the substance of the rule;
(2) the requirement of unanimous consent to the final negotiated rule pro-
posal;
(3) increased costs for the agency involved; and
(4) continuation of the notice and comment procedures for those not par-
ticipating in the negotiation.
These characteristics create a situation in which the agency has relatively
low bargaining power over the interest groups participating in the negotia-
tion process relative to its position in regulation-by-rulemaking, since any
participant can veto the outcome or challenge the result in court. Indeed,
the great failing of regulation-by-negotiation from the point of view of
the agency is that institutionally negotiated rulemaking reduces the agency's
power relative to the regulated entities and other interest groups by grant-
ing them a veto over the consensus required. Nonetheless it may offer
agencies important benefits in some circumstances, such as gaining "buy-
in" from particular interest groups to a solution to a regulatory problem.
'I See Coglianese, Assessing, supra note 83, at 418 (quoting the former chair of the
Administrative Conference of the United States at the time it adopted a report favoring negoti-
ated rulemaking as saying that "the Reagan Administration's whole purpose on negotiated
rulemaking was to keep things out of the courts").
116 Id. at 392 (noting no new negotiated rulemakings begun by EPA after 1993 through
2001 date of article). This is consistent with Prof. Coglianese's conclusion to his original
empirical study, in which he noted that while the investment in the extra effort required by
negotiated rulemaking "might once have been thought sound in light of the benefits prom-
ised from a speedier, less contested regulatory process, [iun the absence of these promised
benefits, agencies' continued reliance on public participation methods which do not depend
on consensus would appear the more sensible approach to making regulatory decisions."
Coglianese, Promise and Performance, supra note 63, at 1336.
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D. Regulation-by-Litigation
Regulation-by-litigation operates quite differently from the other two
means of creating regulation. Rather than issue a proposed rule or invite
affected parties to negotiate, an agency sues one or more regulated enti-
ties," 7 charging them with violation of an existing statute, regulation or
common law rule. The lawsuit is often based on a novel interpretation of
the statute or regulation and may concern behavior that the regulated en-
tities believe the agency has accepted in the past. Using the threat of sub-
stantial liability for the alleged breach, the agency then persuades or coerces
the regulated entity to agree to a consent decree or injunctive relief that
includes imposition of substantive regulatory provisions.
Regulation-by-litigation is not simply a lawsuit by a government
agency. To regulate requires the agency to seek substantive relief beyond
mere compliance with existing law or compensation for damages "8 and to
17 Regulation-by-litigation comes in different forms. In some cases, the Department of
Justice brings an action on behalf of a federal agency that has the power to regulate but is
seeking to undertake substantive steps it cannot do directly, as in the diesel litigation. For a
brief account of the diesel litigation, see Diesel Industry Confronts the Emission Settlement,
DIESEL PROGRESS, Dec. 1998, available at 1998 WL 13067704. In other cases, state attor-
neys general bring suit against firms or an industry, where the state officials do not repre-
sent an entity that itself has the power to regulate directly. (Most state attorneys general are
independent officers, not representatives of state regulatory agencies.) At times, the state
may contract out its litigation to private attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis rather
than having the state attorney general handle the legal work. NEW WAVE, supra note 39, at
5. The tobacco industry litigation is an example of this type of regulation-by-litigation. For
discussion of tobacco litigation, see id. at 1-24. In still other cases, government agencies
arrange for grant recipients to bring suit. Efforts by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") to generate gun control regulation fall into this last category
of cases. See Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Circumventing Congress: The HUD Gun
Suit, at http://www.thecre.com/litigation/hud.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Noting that HUD would not be a party to the
taxpayer-funded suit, the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness described the action this way:
In the wake of the [Clinton] Administration's ... failures to get gun control legis-
lation enacted, Executive Branch officials [began] utilizing a different mecha-
nism: litigation. The government, specifically the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD), is organizing a class action lawsuit against gun makers
by requesting [that] federally-funded housing authorities take legal action. The goal
is to achieve changes in the firearms industry that were not obtained through leg-
islation.
Id.
The gun control suit is interesting for a number of reasons. First, like other regulation-
by-litigation examples, the effort seeks to use the judiciary as a means to regulate an indus-
try. The suit is not about violation of law or recovery of damages. It is about regulation. If
successful, the resulting remedy will alter the economic landscape for the industry without
altering any fundamental legislation or regulation. A second aspect of the suit relates to who is
paying for it. Taxpayer money allocated to housing authorities nationwide will be used to
fund the suit. But the suit will not be brought in the name of the United States. Instead, a
regulatory agency, HUD, may be using purchased litigation to accomplish a policy goal that
could not be achieved through the legislative process.
"' Prof. Viscusi offers a useful functional distinction: "Regulatory policies by the fed-
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seek to impose new regulatory obligations." 9 For example, in the tobacco
cases, state attorneys general sought agreement by the defendant compa-
nies to wide ranging limitations on their marketing of their products, and
in the heavy-duty diesel engine cases, EPA sought to impose more stringent
emissions requirements than required by the CAA and then-existing regu-
lations. A regulatory agency or citizen group bringing an enforcement action
against an entity that has allegedly violated a pre-existing rule is thus not
regulation-by-litigation. 21 In such cases the agency is simply seeking com-
pliance with a rule created through traditional rulemaking, statute, or com-
mon law.' 2 Even traditional antitrust litigation 22 is not regulation-by-litiga-
tion as antitrust is itself an alternative to regulation because it seeks to
create market conditions that render other regulatory actions unnecessary
(e.g., the price regulations necessary to constrain regulated monopolies). 123
Asking for substantive relief is not enough to transform litigation into
regulation-by-litigation, however. If an agency asked a court in an enforce-
ment action for relief not authorized by, or expressly forbidden by, its or-
ganic statute, the court would refuse to grant the requested relief. It is only
when the defendant agrees to the substantive relief demanded that the agency
can exceed the unambiguous authority it has under its organic statute. (An
ambiguous statute creates additional opportunities for agencies to stretch the
boundaries of their authority, as in EPA's New Source Review litigation.)
Regulation-by-litigation thus requires settlement as an element. Settlement
is critical because, as Professor Paul Carrington and Derek Apanovitch
noted in commenting on mass tort negotiated settlements, "it is the nature of
eral government usually do not provide any insurance compensation for victims but instead
are focused almost exclusively on establishing regulatory standards for health and safety
.... In contrast, litigation often has as its principal purpose an effort to transfer income to
those who have suffered injuries." Viscusi, Overview, supra note 25, at 6.
119 Common law nuisance suits are thus excluded by the adjective "new."
120 Whether or not a particular enforcement action is an attempt at regulation-by-litigation
can be difficult to determine on the margin. For example, the FDA has great flexibility in en-
forcing its rules on medical devices. "This flexibility to punish (or, presumably, not to
punish) fraud on the agency was especially important in the context of the MDA because
of Congress' consistent refusal to allow FDA to regulate the practice of medicine." Thomas
0. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the
Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 553 (2002).
121 See, e.g., Federal Officials Sue New York City for Underground Tank Violations, 34(l)
SOLID WASTE REPORT (Jan. 10, 2003) (describing suit against New York City for failing to
put pollution control equipment on underground storage tanks required by 1988 regula-
tions), available at 2003 WL 11081156; TVA Faces Federal Lawsuit Over Alleged Enis-
sions Violations at Colbert Plant, UTIL. ENV'T REP., July 26, 2002, at 3 (noting citizen
suits to be filed over alleged violations of CAA opacity standards), available at 2002 WL
11408777.
122 The Microsoft and VISA/MasterCard antitrust suits brought by the federal and state
governments certainly appear to have regulatory elements in the relief sought by the gov-
ernments. To exclude such extraordinary cases we used the adjective "traditional" here.
123 Of course, such regulations would themselves have to be statutorily authorized. Our
point is merely that by engaging in antitrust actions, the government attempts to create a
competitive market, which then renders unnecessary a variety of regulatory activity tradi-
tionally justified by the lack of competition in particular markets.
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a settlement to sublimate questions of right and duty and to silence further
consideration of the merits or the policies advanced by the agreed re-
suIt.' ' 24 Importantly, the role of interest groups in settlement approval pro-
ceedings is significantly more restricted than their role in regulation-by-
rulemaking '2 5 and agencies receive substantial deference from the courts
in regulatory settlements.
26
The legal system generally favors settlements, so we must explain why
they are problematic here. Settlements occur because they offer the parties
an alternative preferable to the cost and uncertainty of litigation. 27 In the
context of private litigation, settlements are often considered welfare-
enhancing because they represent a contractual resolution voluntarily agreed
to by the parties. 28 In the regulatory context, however, the presumption
that settlements are welfare-enhancing is not always justified. A regulated
entity may, of course, simply be conceding the inevitable when confronted
124 Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial
Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 464 (1997). A similar criticism of negotiated rulemaking has been
made by Prof. William Funk. In rulemaking, "[t]he statute is not just a brake or anchor on
agency autonomy; it is the source and reason for the agency's action." In negotiated rule-
making, by contrast, Funk writes, "[t]he law is now merely a limitation of the range of bar--
gaining. The parties to the negotiation are not serving the law, and the outcome of the ne-
gotiation is not legitimized by its service to the law." Funk, supra note 42, at 1374-75. The
rulemaking that follows negotiated rulemaking provides a check on this, although if no one
challenges the negotiated rule in the rulemaking process or in court, then the agency could
exceed its statutory mandate as Funk suggests. Because of the potential check offered by
the rulemaking after the negotiation, however, we believe that this is less of a concern than
the problems with regulation-by-litigation.
'25 For an overview of the issues in approval of settlements in environmental litigation
involving the government, see Carol E. Dinkins, Settlement Issues in Federal Enforcement
Actions, SF97 ALI-ABA 1525 (2001); David L. Callies, The Use of Consent Decrees in Set-
tling Land Use and Environmental Disputes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 871 (1992).
126 The First Circuit, in approving a CERCLA case settlement, noted:
[The] policy of the law to encourage settlements ... has particular force where, as
here, a government actor has pulled the laboring oar in constructing the proposed
settlement.... Respect for the [executive branch] agency's role is heightened in a
situation where the cards have been dealt face up and . . . sophisticated players,
with sharply conflicting interests, sit at the table .... The relevant standard, after
all, is not whether the settlement is one which the court itself might have fash-
ioned, or considers as ideal, but whether the proposed decree is fair, reasonable,
and faithful to the objectives of the governing statute.
United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990). Agencies with par-
ticular expertise in a technical field are also due considerable deference from the courts in
reviewing settlements. See United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409,
1436 (6th Cir. 1991).
27 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1075-76 (1989).
2I This is not always the case even here, however. For example, the FTC and DOJ are
concerned that settlements in intellectual property disputes can diminish competition. Robert
P. Taylor, Practicing Law Institute, Patent Settlements as Antitrust Conspiracies, 617 PLI
PAT. 151, 157 (2000), quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTI-
TRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995).
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by the agency with proof of the regulated entity's wrongdoing and so settle
to save litigation costs or as part of a strategy of seeking leniency.' 29 Such
settlements increase net welfare compared to litigation because the ulti-
mate outcome is not in doubt and the settlement saves both parties the
litigation costs. Where there are hotly contested issues of law or fact,'30 how-
ever, the net welfare effect of settlements is ambiguous. Regulators can
change the regulated entity's decision through actions unrelated to the merits
of their legal or factual claims. By threatening sufficiently large liability,
even a tiny probability of the regulator's success on the merits can pro-
duce an expected liability so great that the regulated entity has no choice
but to settle.' 3' Regulators need not simply threaten massive fines-they
can also tip the balance by threatening retaliation on other fronts (deny-
ing required permits, taking additional time to process requests from the
firm, closely examining the firm's records, creating bad publicity for the
firm). Moreover, because settlements, unlike generally applicable rules, can
vary the terms for different entities, holdouts risk being offered less fa-
vorable terms than those who settle early. 3 2 In these cases settlements are
not entitled to the presumption that they are welfare increasing.
Finally, to constitute regulation, litigation must deal with a sufficient
proportion of the regulated entities that could be covered by regulation-
by-rulemaking such that the substantive provisions are an effective sub-
stitute for a generally applicable rule. Because settlements are not binding
on nonparties, either the settlement itself must serve as a barrier to entry
29 See, e.g., SEC Imposes Minimum Penalty on Reliant for Wash Trades, Cites Company's
Cooperation. POWER MARKETS WK., May 19, 2003, at 9 (noting SEC imposed a lower penalty
on an energy trading company because the company cooperated with the agency).
110 There often are such issues. As Profs. Ruhl and Salzman note, "One need not toil
long in any regulatory field before finding that agencies often produce rules that are com-
plicated, difficult to understand, ambiguous, or contradictory." Ruhl & Salzman, supra note
36, at 761. Under such rules, there are often major differences between agency and outsider
views of how to read the law and facts.
"I' Suppose a regulated company has a net worth of $100 and that EPA threatens it
with a fine of $1,000,000. Even if the company estimates EPA's chance of prevailing and
imposing the fine as only 0.0001, with a probability of 0.9999 that the company will prevail,
and ignoring the possibility of lesser fines and litigation costs, the expected value of the
fine equals $1,000,000 * 0.0001 + $0 * 0.9999 = $100. Similar criticisms have been made
of the impact of the increased negotiating power given to prosecutors under the federal
Sentence Reform Act of 1984. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agree-
ments under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 FR.D. 459 (1988) (describing how sentencing
guidelines enhance prosecutors' "leverage"); Robert G. Moruillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking
the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
137, 151 (1995) (describing consequences of Sentencing Reform Act as "enhancing prose-
cutors' ability to establish the parameters of plea bargaining and to force persons to coop-
erate").
132 See. e.g., Jeffrey R. Parsons & David K. Williams, Considerations Regarding Con-
solidated Defense Arrangements in Environmental Litigation, 432 PLI LIT. 523, 531 (1992)
(noting that plaintiffs will often settle against some defendants to fund litigation and gain
assistance against others). See also Lisa Bernstein & Daniel Klerman, An Economic Analy-
sis of Mary Carter Settlement Agreements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2215 (1995) (explaining how plain-
tiffs can use agreements with individual defendants to fund litigation.).
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or some other barrier to entry must exist or be erected to prevent new
entrants not bound by the settlement's terms from using their freedom from
the substantive provisions to out-compete the settling entities.' 33
Regulation-by-litigation also differs from other forms of regulation
because it often combines large transfers of money to the government and
others with substantive regulation. The diesel engine settlements, for ex-
ample, included payments of a billion dollars in fines and agreed-upon
offsetting actions.'34 Agencies do, of course, sometimes fine regulated enti-
ties for violations of rules. Such fines can be substantial.'35 Imposition of
a fine alone, or a fine in combination with an agreement to correct clear vio-
lations of existing regulatory regimes, differs from combining the impo-
sition of new substantive rules and payment of substantial fines. When an
agency is negotiating jointly the imposition of substantive rules and financial
provisions, the negotiations at least implicitly become a process of trading
off the payment and the substance, with concessions in one area likely to
imply a need for reciprocation in the other. In the tobacco case, for example,
agreement to the massive payments to state governments would have
been impossible without simultaneous agreement to the pseudo-tax struc-
ture to shift those payments from the tobacco companies to smokers.
3 6
Sometimes a portion of the money is used directly to reward non-
governmental actors through attorneys' fees and mandatory payments. For
example, the Hudson Institute estimated that the tobacco litigation settle-
ment will produce payments of $500 million per year to 200 to 300 lawyers,
perhaps in perpetuity. 37 As Professor Viscusi notes, the tobacco settlement
"establishe[d] a tax on the product payable to the plaintiff and paid for al-
most entirely by the consumer rather than a damages payment paid for by
133 See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 351. These factors raise important questions about
the settlements' impact on antitrust laws. id.
134 The fines and cost of mandated actions imposed in the diesel litigation were based
on sales of engines alleged to violate the rule and totaled:
Caterpillar $60,000,000
Cummins $60,000,000
Mack Trucks $31,000,000
Detroit Diesel $24,500,000
Volvo $14,000,000
Navistar International $ 2,900,000
Jeff Johnson, EPA Fines Engine Makers, TRANSPORT Topics, Oct. 26, 1998, at 120.
135 See, e.g., Kevin Pang, Sara Lee Unit to Pay a Record Fine, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2003, at
I (noting EPA's imposition of a $5.25 million civil fine to resolve ozone regulation viola-
tions).
'36 Viscusi, Tobacco, supra note 71, at 46-48.
137 JOHN FUND & MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER, THE DANGERS OF REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION 9 (2000) (quoting Michael Horowitz of the Hudson Institute). See also Effec-
tive Tobacco Reduction Programs and the Use of Tobacco Revenues from the Settlements
for This Purpose: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science & Technology Comm.,
106th Cong. I (2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain, Chairman, Senate Commerce, Sci-
ence & Technology Comm.).
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the defendant."'38 Other settlements have required defendants to fund interest
group activities.'3 9 Campaign contributions from those who receive these
payments are another potential benefit to politicians of choosing regulation-
by-litigation, creating, at a minimum, a perceived corruption problem. 4 0
Agencies cannot use regulations to extract cash legitimately from regu-
lated entities, although the regulatory process often offers opportunities for
corruption.' 4' Regulation-by-litigation, on the other hand, differs in kind
from run-of-the-mill political corruption in that the resource grab is not
only not under the table but incorporated into official court orders. The
lure of deep pockets has had an impact on regulators' behavior: Philadelphia
created a special litigation unit "to seize the potential revenue benefit that
could be gained by the City of Philadelphia acting as plaintiff."'' 42 The mone-
tary rewards of regulation-by-litigation thus distort regulatory decision-
138 Viscusi, Overview, supra note 25, at 3.
"19 See, e.g., Jeff Montgomery, Delaware Landowners Test Wetlands Regulations, NEWS J.
(Del.), May 8, 2003, at 13 (describing settlement of wetlands regulatory case by donation
of $62,500 to "a nonprofit conservation group").
140 For example,
contingency fee contracts were awarded without competitive bidding to attorneys
who often bankrolled state political campaigns. In Mississippi, attorney general
Mike Moore selected his number one campaign contributor, Richard Scruggs, to
lead the Medicaid recovery suit. In Texas, attorney general Dan Morales chose
five firms for the state's multibillion-dollar tobacco litigation; four of the five
firms contributed a total of nearly $150,000 to Morales from 1990 to 1995.
Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Wars: Will the Rule of Law Survive?, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y
45, 53 (1998). Not all analysts concur the corruption is a major ongoing problem. Prof.
David Dana, for example, argues that "[t]he corruption explanation is ... unpersuasive"
because "not all AGs are elected [as are Mississippi's and Texas's], so at least the cam-
paign contribution concern may be limited in geographic scope" and "the Texas AG has
lost office and is now under criminal investigation, which suggests that AGs will now ex-
pect to experience some political and perhaps legal punishment if they allocate what turn
out to be extremely large contingency fees to known political allies." As a result, "in the
wake of tobacco litigation, it seems likely that the retention of private contingency fee counsel
will be subject to new ex ante controls, such as public disclosure and competitive bidding.
Thus, contingency fee agreements in the future are not likely to be a particularly easy or
low-cost means for AGs to secure illicit benefits, even assuming this was previously the
case." David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evalua-
tion of Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 319 (2001).
M4' See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 37 (1993) (describ-
ing how Nixon administration used the threat of OSHA regulation to raise campaign funds).
142 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, FIVE YEAR FINANCIAL PLAN (FY2002-FY2006) (2001),
quoted in Randall Lutter & Elizabeth Mader, Litigating Lead-Based Paint Hazards, in
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 106, 107 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). As Profs. Lutter
and Mader concluded in their review of lead paint litigation, "the primary rationale for gov-
ernment agencies to sue companies associated with lead-based paint appears reminiscent
of Willie Horton's [Sutton's] famous rejoinder about why he robbed banks: that's where
the money is." Id. at 124.
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making by making substantive regulations that can be imposed via litiga-
tion more attractive than t hey would otherwise be.'43
In this context, regulation-by-litigation has several advantages for the
regulator. First, it shifts bargaining power to the regulator, as the ability to
threaten large financial losses may induce the regulated to accept substantial
portions of the regulator's substantive wish list. Second, it greatly re-
duces the potential for challenges to the substance of the regulation and the
authority of the regulator.' As Michigan Supreme Court Justice Robert
Young noted, the judicial process, "though public in name, is private in
essence."'45 The defendants' silence has been purchased through the settle-
ment itself; nonparties are not required to be given notice of the action and
require the court's permission to even be heard on the merits.'46 Third, the
regulator can extract resources as part of the settlement. Fourth, "the alloca-
tion of responsibilities for policy becomes blurred, as litigation becomes
the mechanism forcing regulatory changes."'47 Fifth, it allows substitution
of the regulator's preferences for public preferences. As Professor Viscusi
noted with respect to the tobacco litigation, for example, the tobacco compa-
nies, the states, and the attorneys all had reasons to prefer the pseudo-tax
structure imposed to damages awards, but it was unlikely that cigarette con-
sumers would do so. As they were not represented in the settlement proc-
ess, cigarette consumers' views did not have a place at the table'48 and, not
surprisingly, were ignored.
The important features of regulation-by-litigation are:
(1) lack of public participation in creating the substantive regulation through
the use of settlements;
(2) reduced opportunity for challenges to the agency's views of its authority
and the facts, because the threat of substantial penalties is used to coerce
agreement by the only formal parties to the lawsuit;
(3) piecemeal nature of the regulatory outcome, with settlements binding
only individual parties and not the public generally; and
43 Prof. Bruce Benson and others have documented a similar distortion in law enforce-
ment efforts where civil forfeiture laws grant law enforcement departments a portion of the
property forfeited, producing a shift of resources towards crimes that yield forfeitures. See
BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 141-42 (1998); Brent D. Mast, Bruce L. Benson & David W. Rasmussen,
Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, 104 PUB. CHOICE 285, 303 (2000).
14 It does not completely eliminate the potential for such challenges, of course. The
tobacco settlements were challenged by a variety of groups, for example.
145 Justice Robert Young, "State Judicial Elections: Past, Present, and Future," remarks
at conference sponsored by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform and the Manhat-
tan Institute, Washington, Apr. 2001, quoted in James Wootton, Comment, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 304, 305 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
146 See FED. R. Clv. P. 24 (stating conditions for intervention as of right and permissive
intervention).
141 Viscusi, Overview, supra note 25, at I.
141 Viscusi, Tobacco, supra note 71, at 52.
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(4) sufficient coverage of the regulated industry to serve as a substitute for
generally applicable rules.
These characteristics create a means of regulating that is quite different
from both regulation-by-negotiation and regulation-by-rulemaking.
III. MAKING THE CHOICE
We have now established the first part of our argument, that agencies
purposefully choose among alternative means of regulation. 149
The second part of our argument is that agencies' choices among the
means of imposing regulations matter. One might argue that the means do
not. For example, if the use of litigation to achieve regulatory goals is simply
another tool for regulators, ultimately no different from using the traditional
rulemaking or regulation-by-negotiation processes, then the choice is
perhaps interesting, but unimportant. If it is true that regardless of how a
regulation is imposed the same people bear the cost of the process (the tax-
payers), the same people benefit from the regulation, and the same people
bear the burden of any changes that result (the consumers who are affected
by higher prices and the owners of specialized assets that depreciate be-
cause of the action) and the sizes of those costs, benefits, and burdens are
invariant across methods of regulating, then the choice of means is largely
irrelevant. Agencies would simply consider the transaction costs of each ap-
proach and pick the least costly option. This view, however, neglects sev-
eral important issues.
First, according to the precepts of public choice theory, the regulatory
choice is made based on the costs and benefits to the regulator rather than
based on some aggregated social welfare calculation. This suggests that
agencies assign little if any value to the costs incurred by an industry in de-
fending itself against a lawsuit. It also suggests that agencies assign little if
any value to the costs borne by consumers if the agencies' regulatory ac-
149 Although this seems like an obvious point to us, it has provoked discussions when
made while describing the Article, prompting us to discuss the point in more detail than
might otherwise seem necessary. The point seems implicit in discussions of regulation-by-
negotiation. See, e.g., Harter, Adolescents, supra note 83, at 1408 ("Negotiated rulemaking
is not an end in itself, but rather is a tool for making regulatory decisions. Like other tools,
it has its time and place and, like other tools, can impose costs and hardships if misused.
Thus, negotiated rulemaking should only be employed if its criteria are met .... ); Suss-
kind & McMahon, supra note 84, at 152 (discussing importance of rule selection for suc-
cess of negotiated rulemaking). Our discussion supra at notes 106-112 and associated text
sets forth this argument in detail. It is also certainly well documented that agency choices
about how to conduct litigation, including which cases to file and when to settle, are the
result of choices that vary from administration to administration. See Eric Helland, Prose-
cutorial Discretion at the EPA: Some Evidence on Litigation Strategy, 19 J. REG. ECON.
271, 290 (2001) ("The most obvious conclusion from the results is that there are important
differences in the way in which EPA chooses to enforce pollution control laws and these
differences can be explained in part by the presidential administration under whose aus-
pices the case is tried.").
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tivity results in a new regulatory mandate, except when explicitly required to
do so by statute.' ° Of course, when imposing such costs on defendants or
consumers generates political costs for the regulators, those costs will be
considered by the agencies. As different methods of regulation impose
different constraints on agencies, the substance of the rules will differ
depending on the method used to regulate. Thus different people may bear
the costs of the process depending on which process is chosen.
Second, the different political costs to the agency of proceeding un-
der various methods can influence the substance of the regulation consid-
ered. For example, distributional effects of regulatory policy may influence
regulators' choice of means. When regulations have a regressive impact
(effectively redistributing income from poorer to richer), their results may be
politically unpopular. Directly increasing a tax on a product used more heav-
ily by lower-income consumers (e.g., cigarettes) may thus be politically
unpalatable. 5' Indirectly imposing a price increase through litigation, on
the other hand, avoids the direct link between regulatory action and in-
come redistribution. Thus while the tobacco lawsuits led to price increases
of more than thirty cents per pack nationwide,5 2 this significant tax in-
crease on cigarettes was imposed without the direct political costs to anti-
tobacco interests of seeking a tax increase on the product from the state
legislatures. 53 The method of regulation chosen may therefore alter sub-
stantive features of the regulation created by changing the politically fea-
sible set of possible regulatory measures, again making the substance
relate to the method. Thus different people may bear the costs of the regula-
tion, depending on the method chosen to impose it.
110 Thus, for example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000), was
passed to require agencies to consider compliance costs for small entities in traditional
regulatory activities. Many regulatory statutes require agencies to consider the costs to
consumers and producers of new products. See Eric A. Posner, Using Net Benefits Accounts
to Discipline Agencies: A Thought Experiment, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1473, 1473-74, 1486-
88 (2002) (discussing existing and potential uses of various forms of cost-benefit analysis
in regulatory statutes). The absence of such explicit requirements in the litigation process
reduces the importance of such costs in the agency's consideration of regulation-by-litigation
relative to its consideration of them in regulation-by-rulemaking and regulation-by-
negotiation.
151 See Viscusi, Tobacco, supra note 71, at 30-31 (criticizing taxes on cigarettes as
"extremely regressive" and "regressive in proportional as well as absolute terms" and not-
ing political reluctance to increase tax).
152 W. Kip Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking,
42 J.L. & EcON. 575, 580 (1999) ("In economic terms, the penalties are almost tantamount
to a per-pack tax, which for an $8 billion annual payment would be $33 per pack. Shortly
after the signing of the settlement, cigarette prices reportedly rose nationally by about $.35
per pack, and they have since risen more.").
153 See Michael Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos Masquerading
as Tort Law, 71 Miss. L.J. 631, 662 (2001) (settlement "is in reality a regressive tax");
Viscusi, Tobacco, supra note 71, at 50-51 ("[Wlhat distinguished the out-of-court settle-
ment of the tobacco litigation was that these tax and regulatory policies were enacted
without the usual input that accompanies the development of policies of this type.").
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Third, the shift in the role of the courts fundamentally alters the ba-
sic function of the courts in regulation. The ultimate question to be an-
swered about regulatory actions is whether or not costs net of benefits are
being involuntarily imposed on individuals by private actors.'54 If we con-
clude that harm is being imposed involuntarily on individuals, then we
must decide how to deal with the problem.'55 By constitutional design, these
collective decisions are to be made by elected representatives.'56 Decisions to
regulate are political decisions made by legislative bodies. By passing the
CAA, for example, Congress was forced to accept political responsibility
for the costs it imposed and the benefits it created. 5 Shifting regulatory
decisions to litigation settlements alters that allocation of responsibility.
Decisions about the content of regulations are also important. Inherent in
the acceptance of the delegation of these questions to unelected agencies
is that the decisions be made in the open and with the opportunity for public
participation. Regulation-by-litigation, and to a lesser extent regulation-by-
negotiation, inappropriately closes off those choices. For example, in the
tobacco case, regulation-by-litigation was used to tax cigarettes although
"there is little question that the appropriate taxation of cigarettes is a leg-
islative issue, not a judicial one."'58
Moreover, although delegation to agencies of the details of regulat-
ing allows Congress to shed some political responsibility for the costs of
the regulations, Congress remains ultimately politically responsible for
the costs of the regulations agencies impose. The function of judicial re-
view of agency action is to ensure that the political-regulatory bargain made
'." See Epstein, NEW WAVE, supra note 39, at 60-61.
Id. at 61. Of course, Prof. Epstein noted that he was describing a traditional view
here. Id. By contrast, he notes, the modern view of collective decision-making seems to
hold that legislative bodies are just the first fora for resolving policy questions. If the legis-
lature fails to act, that failure is a sign that democracy does not work effectively rather than
a sign that a position advocating action has been rejected legitimately. This failure is
caused by special interest groups with unfair power distorting the democratic process. When
the legislature fails to work properly, it is time for the losing special interest group to turn
to the courts, or so the theory goes. Id.
Industry is then placed in the position of being hounded by litigators whose success
turns on winning in only one of many jurisdictions. When the political stakes are high enough,
legislative bodies have been known to alter state rules governing civil procedure in order to
facilitate regulation-by-litigation. For an example involving the state of Maryland, see
FUND & WOOSTER, supra note 137, at 13. For the reverse of this, see comments by litigator
Michael Wallace in NEW WAVE, supra note 39, at 8-9, where he explains how the Missis-
sippi legislature adopted a tort reform act in 1994 that would have precluded the successful
tobacco suit.
156 Whether this means there should be a non-delegation doctrine with teeth is a ques-
tion we leave to another day.
117 When we say "accept," we overstate the case. Congress, of course, attempted to
avoid as much responsibility for the costs and claim as much credit for the benefits of the
legislation as it could. Thus a number of provisions of the various CAA Amendments of
1970, 1977, and 1990 look a great deal like they are intended to conceal any responsibility
for costs. Nonetheless, Congressional passage of legislation does mean that Congress has
taken at least some responsibility for the provisions of the legislation.
158 Viscusi, Tobacco, supra note 71, at 31.
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in the legislature is upheld by the agency. 59 By reviewing both the proce-
dure and the agency's fidelity to legislative intent, the courts play a vital
role in substantively constraining agencies. When their review shifts to ap-
proving a settlement, however, courts' attention is no longer focused on the
legislative intent behind the statute but on the mechanics of settlement. With
the defendants, who are in the best position to uncover agency infidelity,
silenced by the settlement, there is no voice in the courtroom to argue
against the settlement except for those permitted by the court to play a lim-
ited role through intervention. Moreover, in some instances governments
have taken steps to alter the legal system to favor their position in regula-
tion-by-litigation suits, distorting the legal process."6 The larger point is
that the various branches have different strengths and weaknesses in cop-
ing with regulatory issues.'6 ' Regulation-by-litigation and regulation-by-ne-
gotiation shift too much discretion to agencies and limit the important roles
legislatures and courts play in ensuring regulators are accountable.
Finally, as Professor Coglianese has noted:
When legislators or executive branch officials impose procedural
requirements on administrative agencies, they purportedly do so
in order to achieve some instrumental goals, including improving
the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of regulations, preventing cap-
ture, reducing conflict, or changing the pace of the rulemaking
process. These goals may not always be, or perhaps even are sel-
dom likely to be, fully consistent with the broader public inter-
est, but the reforms are nevertheless intended to have some con-
sequences. 162
Thus, Congress and the executive branch put constraints on agencies be-
cause they intend that those constraints produce a result. If agencies can
evade those constraints, they are likely to produce a different result than
intended by Congress or the executive.
159 Landes & Posner, Interest Group, supra note 77, at 880-85 (modeling judges as en-
forcing bargains made by others).
'60 Prof. Viscusi describes how this worked in the tobacco litigation:
State attorney general suits put state judges, appointed by the very governments
serving as plaintiffs, in a position to make rulings that, by undermining industry
defenses, left the defendants with no choice but to agree to transfer immense sums to
those states or risk immediate bankruptcy (because appeals would require posting
of a bond equal to the entire verdict plus expected interest during the appeals proc-
ess).
Viscusi, Tobacco, supra note 71, at 61.
61 See NEIL KoMISAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996).
162 Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 1115.
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To summarize, it is our contention that regulators have a choice of how
to create new substantive regulatory measures, as well as a choice about
whether to create such measures at all, and that those choices matter. Each
method has advantages and disadvantages for the regulator, for the regu-
lated, and for others, including the consumers of the regulated entities'
products and the employees of the regulated entities. Understanding how
regulators make their choices is critical to understanding how legislatures
must structure regulatory statutes if they hope to control agencies.'63 To
provide a framework for doing so, we next turn to a brief survey of insights
from the theories of regulation used by social scientists to understand
agency behavior; we use these insights to support our necessary contention
that agencies choose how to regulate in a predictable way."6
A. Theories of Regulation
We briefly examine the theories developed by political scientists, histo-
rians, and economists to explain why and how governments regulate. These
theories give us a framework for understanding agencies' incentives in the
regulatory process, a vital piece of any attempt to explain agency behavior.
1. The Public Interest Theory
The oldest theory of regulation, the public interest theory, holds that
regulators purposefully seek to improve the nation's overall well being.'65
Each regulator is motivated to serve a broadly defined public interest. If pol-
lution is the problem to be addressed, then regulators seek to minimize
global costs in reducing the costs pollution involuntarily imposes on so-
ciety by choosing the least costly method of regulation and the most ap-
propriate regulatory measures to do so. If the costs of regulating are larger
than the costs pollution imposes, then no action is taken. The theory pos-
its that regulators generally seek to serve the public interest, not special
interests such as the interest of one state or community, or the interests of
a particular industry or firm. 166
163 It is, of course, possible that legislatures do not want to control agencies, but prefer
to allow them to operate with only loose supervision, allowing the legislatures to sell the
service of reining in the agencies. See supra note 141.
'164 We thus disagree with Prof. Kenneth Abraham who concluded that "regulation-by-
litigation, within broad bounds, may strike like lightning, almost randomly." Abraham, supra
note 30, at 222.
165 For an overview and critique of several theories of regulation, including the public
interest theory, see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Adminis-
trative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998). For a modern attempt to articulate a public
interest theory, see Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 167, 168 (1990).
166 Croley, supra note 165, at 66-67 (noting that the theory assumes that regulators "at
times . . . seek to advance the interests of the citizenry at large" as well as their own inter-
est in staying in power).
[Vol. 29
Choosing How To Regulate
The public interest theory recognizes that politicians and regulators
are human, and that as a result errors and even deliberate acts of chicanery
will sometimes occur, but the theory implies that examining regulatory
choices as though politicians and bureaucrats seek to serve all interests taken
together provides the best explanation of regulatory outcomes. Modem pub-
lic interest theorists have modified the theory to consider the self-interest
of the regulators as well.'67 Outright corruption and regulations that pri-
marily benefit special interests are aberrations rather than outcomes pre-
dicted by particular conditions.
A public interest theory of the choice of means of regulation would de-
pend on regulators choosing the social cost minimizing method. There are
obvious flaws with the public interest theory, not the least of which is that
measures furthering special interests at the expense of society as a whole
appear too frequently to be best explained as random noise. Selection of
the means of regulation based on minimizing social costs is thus unlikely
to satisfactorily explain regulators' choice of means. Despite its flaws,
considering the public interest theory offers an important insight for un-
derstanding how regulators choose to regulate: our theory cannot depend
on assumptions that public officials are concerned only with serving spe-
cial interests. Publicly interested public servants do exist and, while it would
be wrong to assume agencies are populated only by angels, it would be
equally wrong to assume they are populated only by devils. It is often the
angels we need fear the most, however. As Justice Breyer noted, agencies
are sometimes afflicted with tunnel vision and place too great a weight on
solving the problems within their jurisdiction at the expense of other pri-
orities. 6 ' Legislatures will sometimes seek to impose substantive limits on
agencies' powers. Such limits may well appear to the public-spirited regula-
tor as the result of an illegitimate backroom "political deal" and so de-
serving of subversion if possible. 16 9 Agencies are not Platonic guardians,
167 Id. at 67.
161 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGU-
LATION 11 (1993) ("[E]ach employee's individual conscientious performance effectively
carries single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point where it brings about
more harm than good.").
169 In the tobacco litigation, for example, state attorneys general often used litigation as
a means of making an "end run" around legislatures that would not accept their proposals.
See Dana, supra note 140, at 319-20 ("The most persuasive explanation for why AGs
would retain contingency fee counsel is that the AGs perceive a need to bypass state legis-
latures. Both critics and defenders of the AGs' use of contingency fee agreements concur
that had the AGs sought legislative funding to hire a staff to prosecute the tobacco litiga-
tion or to pay outside lawyers on a pay-as-you-go, hourly basis, they would have been re-
buffed. Indeed, it appears that some governors and AGs were so rebuffed.") (footnote omit-
ted). See also Viscusi, Tobacco, supra note 71, at 53-55 (noting role of "public health
community" in using litigation to prompt federal regulatory activity and to overcome legis-
lative reluctance to act); Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Litigation as Regulation: Fire-
arms, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 67, 68 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (noting that
gun liability suits are brought by local governments seeking "what Congress and most state
legislatures have been unwilling to legislate").
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however, and even politically motivated substantive limits are nonetheless
legislatively authorized substantive limits. Regulators may seek to overturn
or prevent such deals, but they should not do so by subverting the restric-
tions imposed by the legislature.10 When agencies have a choice of means
with which to regulate, their choices may be based on the ability to evade
constraints imposed by the legislature.
2. Capture Theory
Dissatisfaction with the predictive ability of the public interest theory
led to the development of capture theory, derived from the work of politi-
cal scientist Marver Bernstein'' and economic historian Gabriel Kolko. 72
Like the public interest theory, capture theory starts with the notion of poli-
ticians serving the public interest. Unlike the public interest theory, cap-
ture theory recognizes the ambiguities inherent in defining the public inter-
est. Even dedicated and well-meaning politicians face a fundamental prob-
lem: there is no clear-cut definition of what might be the public interest
for every bill being considered in a legislative session, and so how to vote
may not be easily determined.'73
Suppose the issue at hand has to do with regulating NO, emissions
from heavy-duty diesel engines. What is the standard that serves the public
interest? Based on positions taken by various groups, we can predict that
legislative or administrative consideration of the problem would likely
draw proposals from at least the following:
Engine makers argue that the best route to reduced pollution is man-
dating cleaner fuel;' 74 fuel refiners resist this suggestion, insisting that im-
proved engine design offers cheaper ways to obtain reduced pollution;'75
one set of environmental pressure groups focused on global warming ad-
vocates technologies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which
include greater reliance on diesel, 76 while another group rejects those
170 See Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 66, at 571-82 (describing Secretary of
the Interior Bruce Babbitt's campaign to subvert the General Mining Law of 1872).
171 See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(1955).
'
7 2 See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963).
173 Indeed, providing service to the public may be an outcome of the legislative proc-
ess, not an input to it. In any case, the dedicated legislator finds an ample supply of private
and public sector advisors who happily recommend how best to vote on particular issues.
174 See Dan Lang, Attention to Sulfur Content Pleases Engine Manufacturers, TRANS-
PORT TOPICS, Feb. 14, 2000, at 13 ("The Engine Manufacturers Association is hailing an
Environmental Protection Agency proposal to require deep reductions in the sulfur content
of diesel fuel.").
"I See John Wislocki, Bush Team Reopens Diesel Sulfur Rule, TRANSPORT ToPICS, Jan.
29, 2001, at 1, 33 (noting oil industry attempts to get low-sulfur fuel rule weakened).
176 See Jeffrey Ball, Fuel for Debate: California Clean-Air Czar's Shift is New Boost for
Diesel Engines, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2002 (noting support for diesel by Dr. Alan Lloyd,
head of California Air Resources Board, as well as by some EPA officials, on grounds that
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technologies over concern for particulate emissions;'77 natural gas pro-
ducers lobby for increased use of their product as an alternate fuel to die-
sel; 7 ' railroads seek rules that will reduce the use of long-distance trucks
using heavy-duty engines of any type;'79 domestic trucking concerns point
to Mexican trucks entering the U.S. as a more important source of pollut-
ants and urge restrictions; 8 ' EPA's air programs office argues for fuel
diesel is a better technology for dealing with global warming).
" The Sierra Club objects to the use of diesel engines to reduce overall greenhouse
gas emissions:
European environmentalists and government officials have been more comfortable
with diesels than their American counterparts. "A liter of diesel takes one farther
and produces fewer greenhouse gases," said Albrecht Schmidt, an energy expert
for Germany's Green Party. "The big problem with diesel are the small particulates,
but we think that problem can be solved with new particulate filters." American envi-
ronmentalists remain highly critical. "Diesel is the quick and dirty way to increase
fuel economy," said Daniel Becker, the director of energy and global-warming policy
at the Sierra Club. "As long as we have other technologies that are clean, I don't
see the point in producing carcinogenic soot."
Edmund L. Andrews, W. Europe Embraces Diesel Cars That Get 78 mpg, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 27, 2001, at AI0. This issue also divides politicians. See Tom Meersman, A Divide on
Law of the Land: Coleman and Wellstone Both Call Themselves Environmentalists, but
They Stand FarApart on Some Major Issues, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Oct. 21, 2002, at lB (noting
the divergence in positions between Senate candidates both claiming to be environmental-
ists, with one emphasizing prevention of global warming and the other cleaning up con-
taminated land and creating parks).
178 See, e.g., Yet Again, NGVs Outperform Diesel, Natural Gas Vehicles Coalition
("NGVC") website, at http://www.ngvc.org/ngv/ngvc.nsf/bytitle/release02009.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). NGVC defines
its Government Affairs Committee's mission at the federal level as follows:
In the area of federal legislation, the goal of the Government Affairs Committee
(GAC) is to stimulate NGV market development by convincing the Congress to
pass and the President to sign into law legislation that rewards NGVs for the envi-
ronmental, energy security and other benefits they provide. Legislative targets in-
clude tax incentives, appropriations/grants, other incentives, increased federal sup-
port for RD&D and the removal of regulatory barriers.
Id., at http://www.ngvc.org/ngv/ngvc.nsf/bytitle/federallegislation.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). The Coalition is made up of
"more than 180 companies interested in the promotion and use of natural gas and hydrogen
as transportation fuels, including: engine, vehicle and equipment manufacturers[,] fleet
operators and service providers[,] natural gas companies[,] and environmental groups and
government organizations." Id., at http://www.ngvc.org/ngv/ngvc.nsf/bytitle/aboutngvc.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
'
79 See Thomas D. Simpson, Don't Overlook Truck Sizes and Weights, 204(1) RAILWAY
AGE 12 (Jan. 1, 2003) (describing rail industry's lobbying efforts to block increase in al-
lowable truck weights including use of environmental arguments), available at 2003 WL
14653507; John D. Schulz, Making a Wish List, TRAFFIC WORLD, Feb. 4, 2002, at 14 (not-
ing that truck sizes and weights were "[liargely frozen because of savvy railroad industry
lobbying as part of the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act"), available at
2002 WL 8043913; Patricia McCullough, Who's the Environmental ... Bad Guy?, HEAVY
DUTY TRUCKING, Oct. 1993, at 62 (describing rail campaign against trucking).
180 On the overall truck dispute, see Carrie Ann Arett, Comment, The Mexican Truck-
ing Dispute: A Botleneck to Free Trade, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 561 (203).
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additives to reduce emissions, but EPA's ground water office opposes some
additives as potential ground water contaminants;' 8' the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget criticizes proposed actions as too expensive;'82 the truck-
ing industry warns of lost jobs from higher costs;'83 and retailers and just-
in-time manufacturers resist regulatory measures that increase trucking
costs on grounds that they will cause a general economic slowdown.8 4
In many cases, these various special interest groups credibly claim to
be serving the public interest, despite the obvious disagreement amongst
"I' The controversy over the gasoline additive MTBE illustrates the potential for such
conflicts. After its use was mandated by EPA to improve air quality, it was discovered to
cause significant ground water pollution problems.
MTBE is a particularly important case of scientific uncertainty because it illus-
trates the problem of cross-media pollution, a problem only exacerbated by the cur-
rent structure of EPA. Use of MTBE to address air pollution caused new water
pollution problems. Air pollution regulators who made the key decisions surrounding
the introduction of MTBE did not have adequate animal studies to assess the risks
of drinking and swimming water contamination. They also failed to communicate
with other regulators about the problem of leaking underground storage tanks or
understand the special geological significance of MTBE's solubility as a pathway
into groundwater.
Paul S. Weiland & Robert 0. Vos, Reforming EPA's Organizational Structure: Establishing
an Adaptable Agency Through Eco-Regions, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 91, 100-01 (2002)
(citations omitted).
For a thorough discussion of contradictions of the fuel additives program, see gener-
ally Adler, Clean Fuels, supra note 72. Agency rivalries can hamper effectiveness. See,
e.g., Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of EPA's
Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L. 683, 757 (1988) (noting "a
relatively high level of rivalry among EPA regional offices, the Agency's headquarters, and
the DOJ [during the period studied]. To some extent, these conflicts diminished the effec-
tiveness of the government's overall enforcement effort"). See also Coglianese, Promise
and Performance, supra note 63, at 1291-94 (discussing reformulated gasoline rule as an
example of the failure of rulemaking-by-negotiation).
82 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2276-82 (2001)
(surveying OMB's role in several administrations).
83 See, e.g., Tania Douek, North America Regional-Groups Team Up to Defy US Ruling on
Mexican Trucks, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, Dec. 3, 2002 (describing coalition of trucking
interests and environmental pressure groups opposing NAFTA ruling on allowing Mexican
truckers access to US market), available at 2002 WL 104064634.
184 We extrapolate from other positions taken by "just in time" manufacturers. See,
e.g., Coalition of New England Companies for Trade website, at http://www.conect.org/
position.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Re-
view) (group arguing for increased public funding of customs service infrastructure be-
cause "[i]n today's just-in-time world where products are manufactured using parts and
raw materials from global sources, even a delay of a few hours can have huge repercus-
sions"). Interestingly, EPA Region 2 gave an award to a company that adopted a "just-in-
time" manufacturing program on the ground that this allowed the company to reduce stor-
age of hazardous materials on site. See Press Release, EPA, U.S. EPA Selects 32 New
Members for Participation in National Environmental Performance Track, Recognized Top
Environmental Performers (Feb. 11, 2002), at http://www.epa.gov/region02/news/2002/
02006.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Re-
view). EPA's website made no mention of the tradeoff of increased emissions from more
frequent deliveries or increased exposures to motorists to the potential for an accident by
delivery trucks.
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them about what the standard should be. Some of their disputes are fac-
tual but difficult to resolve. For example, either cleaning up diesel fuel is
a cheaper means of obtaining an improvement in air quality than redesigning
engines or the reverse is true,'85 but it will be difficult to obtain sufficient
credible data to answer this question in advance. Adopting the cheaper alter-
native is the preferred solution for society as a whole, 8 6 but even with the
best of intentions and best information available, the legislator or bureau-
crat may not be able to choose based only on objective criteria. Persuaded
by some of the interest groups, the legislator or bureaucrat takes a position
that turns out to be advantageous to certain groups and disadvantageous to
others. The theory describes the winners as having captured the politician
or bureaucrat on this issue. The challenge for the winners is holding the
gained territory when the next piece of legislation or regulation comes for-
ward, and the favors special interest groups can bestow upon the suppor-
tive politician or bureaucrat are the means of doing so.
The capture theory predicts that special interest groups will organize
and use the political process to their private advantage. With this theory
in mind, one can imagine how producers of eastern high-sulfur coal may
have captured key members of Congress when the 1977 CAA Amendments
were being written. Those amendments required scrubbers for newly con-
structed coal-fired electricity plants, even if the plants planned to burn
western low-sulfur coal that did not need scrubbers to meet emissions tar-
gets. "'87 Not requiring all plants to use scrubbers would give western low-
sulfur coal a cost advantage over eastern high-sulfur coal and could reduce
overall SO 2 emissions. It would also increase mining in the West (largely
nonunion, strip mining) and decrease it in the East (largely union, under-
ground mining). Requiring scrubbers for all plants regardless of the type
of coal they burned would eliminate western coal's cost advantage, might
produce higher total SO, emissions by reducing the use of western low-
sulfur coal, and would lead to production of additional solid waste from
the scrubbers. Interest groups on both sides of the scrubber issue argued
that their positions would improve environmental quality.'88 Similarly, his-
tory describes railroad interests capturing the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission ("ICC") and limiting the entry of unregulated motor carriers into
185 It is theoretically possible that the two alternatives are exactly equal in cost, but this
strikes us as so unlikely that we need not worry about a general procedure for how to break
ties in such cases.
186 Of course, some interest groups will undoubtedly argue that both should be done.
Our example assumes that the socially optimal level of air pollution can be obtained by
one or the other, setting aside the inevitable disagreements about what that level should be.
The example is intended to make it as easy as possible to focus on the problem: even when
the contentious issue of how clean the air should be is assumed to be solved, the public-
interested legislator or regulator still faces significant uncertainty in determining how to go
about achieving the goal.
187 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
188 "Environmental" groups took only one side.
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the business of hauling freight, and trucking interests eventually fighting
back and winning a larger share of the business.189 Capture theory offers
us an important additional insight: legislative and agency choices may be
influenced by interest groups seeking private advantage. 90
A capture theory of regulatory choice adds the element of self-interest
among interest groups to the mix. Regulators choose the means of regu-
lating that gives an advantage to the interest group that captures the regu-
lator. This is helpful. To the extent that different groups have different
advantages in rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking, and litigation, they will
favor a particular approach. To the extent that the assessment that environ-
mental pressure groups have a comparative advantage in negotiated rule-
making is correct' 9' and that such groups have successfully captured EPA,
for example, we should see EPA making use of negotiated rulemaking.
Capture theory explains a great deal more of regulatory history than
does the public interest theory alone. But there are key elements of the
political struggle that the theory does not explain. It does not predict which
of several competing interest groups caught in a political struggle will cap-
ture and which will lose out. Why, for example, did the eastern coal pro-
ducers win and western coal producers lose in 1977? Why did truckers at
first lose in competition with the rail interests but later prevail? Capture
theory thus represents a first step toward incorporating interest group
politics into regulatory theory but it is inadequate as an explanation of
regulator behavior. To develop an explanation of regulator choice of means,
we need a theory that includes analysis of the costs and benefits of the
means of regulatory action to the regulator who makes the decision.
3. The Economic Theory
The economic theory of regulation, pioneered by the late Nobel eco-
nomics laureate George Stigler, attempts to explain what happens when
competing interest groups seek to influence political outcomes to their ad-
vantage.1 92 The theory suggests that one should view the legislative proc-
ess as an auction where the content of specific bills is auctioned to the
highest bidder. Those who might bid the most are generally those who have
the most to gain, or lose, net of their cost of organizing and communicat-
ing their bids. The theory thus offers an answer to the puzzle left by the
"I For some detail on this and early ICC history, see James C. Nelson, The Changing
Economic Case for Surface Transport Regulation, in PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL TRANSPOR-
TATION POLICY 7-25 (James C. Miller III ed., 1975). See also DOROTHY ROBYN, BREAK-
ING THE SPECIAL INTERESTS: TRUCKING DEREGULATION AND THE POLITICS OF POLICY
REFORM (1987).
19o The point may seem obvious but advocates of regulatory solutions do not always
discuss the possibility that their proposal will be manipulated by interest groups.
191 See supra note 108 and associated text.
192 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 3 (1971).
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capture theory of why some groups succeed and others do not. Differ-
ences in costs of organizing explain the struggle between eastern and west-
ern coal interests over the 1977 CAA Amendments, for example. The mostly
unionized eastern coal workers were already organized to protect their in-
terests; the largely nonunion western coal workers were not. 193 Key legis-
lators on the EPA Congressional oversight committee came from eastern
coal-producing states, and the eastern coal industry had been organized to
protect its interests in Congress for years.' 94 The resulting lower organizing
costs for eastern coal interests led to a greater net benefit to them and so a
greater investment in the political process. Organizing costs also explain the
railroads' success in dominating the early ICC: there were initially far fewer
railroad companies than trucking companies, making organizing costs lower
for the rail interests. Competing railroads had already organized cartels
for the purpose of allocating freight among freight pool members and for
lobbying state legislative bodies. The railroads owned huge amounts of
land and real estate across the country, thus giving them an important and
permanent political presence in many states. The railroads also initially
had more massive capital investments than truckers, making them more
willing to commit resources to winning regulatory battles.' 95 The costs of
organizing and communicating to Congress were low for railroads, mak-
ing their early domination of the ICC predictable. Over time these advan-
tages reversed and trucking interests came to dominate the ICC.
19 6
The economic theory of regulation adds a great deal of predictive
power compared to its predecessors but still leaves two important gaps.
First, it does not provide a complete role for government actors as self-
interested participants in the regulatory drama. In particular, it does not ad-
dress their role in the supply of interest groups. What if a potentially valu-
able industry group has not yet organized but politicians find it advanta-
geous to have organized support? Can agencies create constituencies for
their services?
A more specialized economic theory of regulation put forward by
Professor Fred McChesney explains how political threats can induce a new
interest group to organize. 97 McChesney describes some regulatory at-
tempts as efforts by politicians to extract payments from the threatened
firms and industries. For example, McChesney's theory suggests that con-
gressional leaders offer bills that call for some industries to be regulated
'ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 187, at 31 ("From the point of view of the
United Mine Workers Union, the scrubbing issue was particularly straightforward. Because
its membership is concentrated in the East, it had no difficulty coming out publicly for
universal scrubbing.").
194 Id. (eastern coal interests "use[d] their considerable political muscle" to help pass bill).
"I GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1887-1916, 34-44 (1965).
196 LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICS: MOTOR
FREIGHT POLICY AT THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 78-79 (1994).
197 Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean
Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991).
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for the first time, only to later see the bills go down in defeat. The bill
inspires an unorganized industry to organize and generates campaign contri-
butions and other meaningful support for politicians. Similarly, a politi-
cian may encourage a regulatory body to open a threatening industry inves-
tigation, only later to chastise the regulatory agency for overreaching its au-
thority after the threatened industry has gained the ear of the legislator.'98
In short, bureaucrats and politicians have the incentive and the means to
alter organizing costs to advance their own interests.
Second, the economic theory has no role for ideology. Professor Bruce
Yandle's "Bootleggers and Baptists" regulation theory explains how success-
ful lobbying efforts often result when one supporting group, the "Baptists,"
takes the moral high ground while the other group, the "bootleggers," seek-
ing to gain competitive advantage, provide political resources.' 99 The name is
drawn from the debate over laws requiring the Sunday closing of liquor
stores. Sunday closings are favored by actual Baptists on moral grounds and
by real bootleggers as a means of reducing their competition from legal
sales of alcohol. Both bootleggers and Baptists support politicians who pro-
mote Sunday closing laws, enabling each group to achieve an objective it
could not achieve on its own. To illustrate an application of the theory in
environmental policy, some environmental pressure groups (the "Baptists")
and corn producers (the "bootleggers") support legislation that requires
the use of ethanol as a fuel supplement in gasoline. 00 The environmental-
ists claim that ethanol is a relatively clean renewable energy source. The
corn producers simply want to expand the market where they have a special-
ized advantage. The "Bootleggers and Baptists" theory explains how im-
plicitly shared lobbying efforts reduce the cost of gaining political advan-
tage and how ideology can create such implicit sharing. It also offers an
instrumental role for ideological claims made during debates over regulatory
policy and explains how some people might perceive the public interest
model of regulation as still valid.
198 For example, western senators and congressmen benefit from attempts by others to
"reform" the General Mining Law of 1872, which they are able to block, thus demonstrat-
ing their value to their constituents. See Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 66. See
also Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemak-
ing, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1058-60 (2000) (describing congressional desire to avoid ac-
countability for agency action while taking credit for addressing issues).
199 Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist,
REGULATION, May-June 1983, at 12-16. See also Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleg-
gers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2002) (ap-
plying theory to explain global warming debate).
200 See Renewable Fuels Ass'n, Who Supports Extending the Ethanol Tax Incentive
Through 2007, 72 ETHANOL REPORT (May 7, 1998) (quoting Rep. Richard Gephardt), at
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/EReports/er050798.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). See also Catherine Zandonella, Going Up
in Smoke, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 18, 2001, at 17; Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, supra note
72. Some environmental groups have now become critical of ethanol.
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When we consider the costs and benefits to both the regulator and
the regulated, we have a more complete picture of how to explain regula-
tor behavior in choosing among alternative means of regulation. Regula-
tors have a choice of four courses of action with respect to a particular set of
facts. The regulator may:
1. do nothing;
2. issue a regulation through rulemaking;
3. negotiate a rule with the relevant interest groups; or
4. sue regulated entities and seek a consent decree that creates new sub-
stantive obligations on the part of the regulated.
In choosing among these alternatives, the agency is constrained by the
facts of the particular issue, the structure of the regulated industry and rele-
vant interest groups, the underlying statute the agency enforces, the agency's
resources, the agency's other responsibilities, politics, and other factors.
By comparing the costs and benefits of these four alternatives, the agency
can choose the action that maximizes its net benefits. As McChesney and
Yandle's elaborations on the economic theory of regulation suggest, this
choice may be quite complex and involve dynamic effects of the agency's
choices, as where an action spurs an industry to organize into a political
pressure group.
B. Understanding Agencies
By combining the insights drawn from the theories described above,
we derive eleven principles that characterize agency incentives, explain-
ing when agencies act, which is the first step in understanding how they
act.
201
1. All else being equal, in a competitive struggle among interest groups
seeking political favors, the winning group will be one that is relatively
small in size, so that the political benefits are concentrated and the cost
of achieving agreement is low.
Interest groups competing for favorable regulatory outcomes will be
willing to commit greater resources if the benefit to each interest group
member is larger. Suppose there are two regulatory outcomes, A and B,
which each generate $1,000,000 in benefits. If 1000 firms will divide the
201 We cannot explain every nuance of agency action. Other approaches may be needed
to explain particular events. For example, there are problems of agency cost in the linkage
between legislator and regulator that we described earlier. The legislator may intend that
the regulator act in a particular way, but the regulator may either misunderstand or have
another agenda to satisfy. Real world regulators must also often serve more than one mas-
ter. Executive branch agencies, such as EPA, must attempt to satisfy both the Congress and
the President, and sometimes the desires of the two masters are in conflict. Theories of
regulation can carry us only so far in building detailed forecasts of regulator behavior.
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benefits of regulatory outcome A and 10 firms will divide the benefits of
regulatory outcome B, the 10 firms will each reap 100 times as much
benefit ($100,000 per firm in outcome B versus $1,000 per firm in out-
come A) as each of the 1,000 firms. The cost of reaching and enforcing
an agreement to cooperate in seeking the desired regulatory outcome will
also be lower for the 10 firms than for the 1000 firms, since negotiating
an agreement on a common strategy and monitoring the contributions of
each firm will be less costly with fewer firms, a key point derived from
the economic theory. Smaller (in number) groups thus have an advantage
over larger (in number) groups in the regulatory process. This explains,
for example, the success of U.S. sugar producers in securing agricultural
programs and tariffs that impose small costs on individual sugar consum-
ers but provide large, concentrated benefits to the small number of U.S.
sugar producers.2 2
2. All else being equal, the political process will prefer regulatory out-
comes that spread the costs of regulations over a large and diverse popu-
lation to outcomes that concentrate costs on smaller, more homogenous
populations.
Small costs incurred by large numbers of individuals are less likely to
provoke resistance than large costs imposed on small numbers of indi-
viduals, by the converse of point one. Similarly, diverse populations will
face higher organizing costs than homogenous ones. Again, the U.S. sugar
tariffs illustrate the point, derived from the economic theory.0 3
3. All else being equal, the winning interest group will be the one that
has the lowest cost of organizing and communicating with politicians.
Groups with lower organizing costs face a lower "price" for their desired
regulatory outcome and hence will "buy" more of it through the political
process. Although we use economic terminology, the point holds under the
capture theory as well as under the economic theory. Eastern coal miners,
largely already organized into unions, thus were cheaper to organize to
support the "dirty coal" bargain in the 1977 CAA than the nonunion
western miners who opposed the deal.
202 See GAO, SUPPORTING SUGAR PRICES HAS INCREASED USERS' COSTS WHILE
BENEFITING PRODUCERS, RCED-00-126 (2000) (estimating that the program provided
approximately $1 billion in benefits for domestic sugar producers and cost U.S. consumers
approximately $1.9 billion in 1998). For a general historical analysis of sugar programs,
see Katherine E. Monahan, Note, U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and International Repercus-
sions of Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 325 (1992).
201 The sugar program costs an estimated $50 per family of four per year, while costing
a total of $1.9 billion per year to sweetener consumers and benefiting producers by about
$1 billion. See United States Sugar Policy, Implications for International Trade and Op-
tions for Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 101st Cong. 146 (1990) (statement of Michael Becker, Director, Citizens for a
Sound Economy); GAO, SUPPORTING SUGAR PRICES HAS INCREASED USERS' COSTS WHILE
BENEFITING PRODUCERS, RCED-00-126 3-5 (2000).
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4. Politicians and all other participants in the political process, includ-
ing members of the bureaucracy, seek to minimize their own costs when
acting on behalf of interest groups or the general public.
This point simply reflects rational actors' preference for lower cost solu-
tions over higher cost solutions and concern with their own welfare and
is consistent with all the theories of regulation.
5. Politicians must signal their performance to interest groups that sup-
port them by taking actions that reflect the symbolic preferences of the
interest group, that deliver real benefits to the group, or that impose real
costs on other groups to the advantage of the interest group.
Here we assume nothing more than that interest groups care about results.
We make no assumptions about their motives, making the point consistent
with all of the theories of regulation. Politicians seeking support of an
interest group must demonstrate through their behavior in office that they
will advance the interest group's agenda by rewarding it directly, sup-
porting policies that the interest group supports, or punishing the interest
group's adversaries. Interest groups' "report cards" on politicians are evi-
dence of this phenomenon: members of Congress supported by trade un-
ions are graded on their positions on free trade and labor legislation, for
example, while environmental interest groups grade votes on environ-
mental legislation." n
6. The unorganized general public is rationally ignorant about the de-
tails of specialized legislation or regulation designed by politicians and
regulators to favor particular groups.
Rational ignorance means that individuals consider the benefits and costs
of being informed." 5 The point is consistent with all the theories of regu-
lation, although it derives from the economic approach. When there are
no perceived benefits to having additional information but there are costs,
the individual rationally chooses to be ignorant on that topic. Thus, for
example, any individual voter in a U.S. presidential election is unable to
affect the result.20 6 Investing resources in learning the positions of the
candidates on various issues by researching the candidates' position pa-
204 See, e.g., LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, 2002 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
SCORECARD (Nov. 2002) (showing how Congressional delegations from various states voted on
environmental issues), available at http://www.lcv.org/images/client/pdfslscorecard02final.
pdf (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
20 See David M. Schizer, Realization as a Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1608
(1998) ("The relevant audience for a politician is the average voter, as opposed to the aver-
age tax practitioner or law review reader. It usually is not worthwhile for voters to under-
stand the tax law except as it applies (narrowly) to them-a phenomenon known as 'ra-
tional ignorance."').
206 Yes, even in Florida in the 2000 Presidential election.
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pers or reading detailed legislative proposals would be a waste of re-
sources.
20 7
Political candidates can attempt to reduce the cost of learning their posi-
tions by, for example, forming political parties and using advertisements
to communicate with voters. Since such communication is designed to
reduce voters' costs of being informed, it is unlikely to include details of
regulatory measures, however. Voters thus know that "Republicans are
tough on crime" and "Democrats want to protect the environment" rather
than the details of the positions underlying such claims. The public is
unlikely to hear that "Republicans favor life sentences for people convicted
of three minor felonies" or "Democrats favor giving high-sulfur, union-
ized coal producers a competitive advantage over cleaner coal mined by
nonunion miners." To the extent that the shorter, less accurate "sound bites"
are successful, they may change the political calculations of particular
politicians. Thus the "tough on crime" sound bite may persuade Democ-
rat politicians to abandon their commitment to civil liberties"' and the
"environment" sound bite may persuade Republican politicians to aban-
don their commitment to economic freedom.2 9
7. Elected officials are the agents of the electorate. Bureaucrats are agents
of elected officials. As in all principal-agent relationships, there are agency
costs to delegating authority, including creation of freedom of action for
the agent to pursue its own interests.
Agents do not perfectly carry out their principals' wishes for a variety of
reasons: agents may seek to pursue their own agendas; principals may im-
perfectly convey their instructions; agents may misunderstand instructions;
principals may communicate conflicting or vague instructions. Agency costs
increase when politicians delegate actions to regulators because such delega-
tions add additional principal-agent relationships (politician-bureaucrat
and bureaucrat-bureaucrat) to the pre-existing public-politician principal-
agent relationship. Of course, politicians can also benefit from the existence
of a potential rogue agency, since it offers them a service (controlling the
agency) to sell.210 This point is consistent with both the capture and eco-
nomic theories.
207 Some individuals, including at least one of the authors of this Article, derive con-
sumption benefits from such research. That some people become informed about politics is
thus not inconsistent with the theory.
205 For example, the USA Patriot Act passed with only one Democratic Senator (Rus-
sell Feingold) voting against the law. Since its passage, the Act has been heavily criticized
by civil liberties groups.
209See PERC, PERC MIDTERM REPORT CARD, BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY (2003) (assessing Bush Administration commitment to market principles
on environmental issues and giving it an overall grade of C-), available at http://www.
perc.org/pdf/reportcard-2002.pdf (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
Republicans in Congress also supported the 1990 CAA Amendments, a statute that clearly
did not comport with the (theoretical) Republican preference for limited government.
210 See supra note 141.
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8. Interest groups prefer long-term, uninterrupted political benefits to short-
term arrangements.
Long-term arrangements yield more benefits than short-term arrangements,
all else being equal, by continuing the stream of benefits. Different forms
of political arrangements have different degrees of durability. A constitu-
tional amendment is more durable than legislation; legislation is gener-
ally more durable than a regulator's promise; and regulation can be limited
by congressional removal of funds for enforcing rules."' Successful law-
suits and settlements are more durable than regulations, since it takes
legislation to override court action. This point is consistent with both the
capture and economic theories.
9. Regulations can cartelize an industry by imposing and enforcing rules
on the industry.
The fundamental problem of cartels from the point of view of a potential
participant is preventing the defection of the cartel's members. 2 If a car-
tel can use regulations to restrict its members' acts and the authority of
regulatory agencies to enforce those rules, it can cooperate more success-
fully than if it must rely on its own efforts." 3 Thus the New Deal's Na-
tional Recovery Act allowed industry groups to form output-limiting car-
tels enforced by the federal government. 1 4 Even without direct carteliza-
tion through regulation, however, regulations can indirectly promote car-
telization. For example, regulations requiring uniform product standards
can generate uniform pricing and output decisions.2"5 This point is consis-
tent with both the capture and economic theories.
211 See Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 66, at 576-77 (describing congres-
sional use of appropriation riders to control Interior Department changes to regulations
under the General Mining Law of 1872).
212 See Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 864 (2001) ("In general a
cartel is much easier to sustain if strong outside sanctions exist to punish defectors. In the
case of ordinary cartels, antitrust law denies enforcement of any explicit agreements, thereby
eliminating most of the effective outside means of sanctioning those who defect."); RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 309-10 (5th ed. 1998) ("a price-fixing
agreement is less stable than most contracts" because of incentive to cheat).
213 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 212, at 572 ("[M]uch legislation seems
designed to facilitate cartel pricing by the regulated firms.").
2'4 See Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy: Where It Has Been,
Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be In Its Third Century, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 239,
242 (1999) ("FDR's response [to the Depression included] ... the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, NRA Codes and the resulting government sponsorship of industry cartels throughout
the economy. Cartels were plainly to be preferred over 'free' competition and the chaos it
brought."); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 212, at 688 (noting NIRA was "car-
tel remedy for depressions").
25 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 212, at 290 (noting homogeneity of
product makes a market more susceptible to price fixing by making it harder to cheat by
altering product quality).
2005]
Harvard Environmental Law Review
10. Regulations typically have differential effects on regulated entities.
Firms experience different costs of complying with regulations. For ex-
ample, a firm with ten plants can spread the fixed costs of a compliance
staff over more facilities than a firm with only one plant. It is thus possi-
ble for one firm to raise competitors' costs by successfully obtaining a regu-
lation that imposes small costs on itself yet high costs on competitors.2"6
Similarly, regulation can generate differential effects across firms. If a
particular control technology favored by regulators happens to be the tech-
nology used by firm A, but not by firms B to Z, then the chosen technology
raises firms B to Z's costs relative to firm A's costs. The differential ef-
fects of regulation may also be enjoyed by firms that produce substitutes
for those made by the regulated industry. For example, firms that produce
diesel fuels may favor regulations that affect diesel engine design and
oppose rules that call for cleaner diesel fuel. Firms that produce natural
gas may favor regulations that raise the cost of burning diesel and so pro-
mote use of natural gas in vehicles. Existing firms will favor regulatory
outcomes that create barriers to entry for potential competitors." 7 Competi-
tion within the field of regulation can be as intense, and as important to
the future of firms, as competition in product markets. Although derived
from the capture and economic theories, this point is consistent with all
the theories.
11. The amount of resources a targeted industry will commit to avoiding
an undesirable regulatory outcome is related to the expected cost of the
regulation, including the uncertainty the regulation generates.
Uncertainty is a cost for regulated entities. If a regulator can guarantee
that a particular regulation will not be changed for a fixed period, the cost
of that regulation is lower for the regulated entity than if no such guaran-
tee is possible. Differences among regulated entities make the cost of uncer-
tainty vary. For example, firms with long lead times and large capital costs
are more vulnerable to the costs of regulatory uncertainty than are firms
with shorter lead times and smaller capital costs.2 8 Once regulation be-
216 See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The
Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TULANE L. REV. 845, 864-65
(1999) ("[T]he costs of complying with environmental regulations will not fall equally on
all producers in a given industry. [Fixed cost investments] will fall harder on small businesses
than on large businesses. Because most paperwork and other regulatory compliance meas-
ures are relatively constant costs, they will also fall harder on small firms and dampen
competition. As compared to small firms, large firms can also absorb the costs of the nu-
merous lawyers needed to weave their way through the regulatory and litigation thicket.").
217 See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REV. 553, 572 (2001) (discussing how regulations can serve as
barriers to entry); Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-seeking behind the
Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM 1, 5 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000).
218 The cost imposed by regulatory uncertainty rises with the length of the product de-
sign cycle that typifies an industry. For example, if the auto industry works on a five-year
design cycle for the interiors of new cars, rule changes that might affect the kind and loca-
tion of passive restraints can be disruptive and costly if imposed in mid-cycle. Lead time
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comes a part of an industry's legal environment, adjustments are made to
accommodate the regulatory constraints. As a result, the more frequent the
change in regulation, all else being equal, the more costly the accommo-
dation process. In short, even if regulation is costly, producers adjust as
the cost of regulation becomes part of their competitive environment. Any
unexpected action taken by regulators disturbs this equilibrium and in-
troduces uncertainty into what was before a somewhat predictable rela-
tionship. When regulatory authorities shift from one form of regulation to
another-when a regulator decides to litigate in lieu of or in addition to
using traditional rulemaking, for example-uncertainty rises within an
industry. Cartelization that may have been formed by older regulations is
threatened, and the normal planning and design cycle is disrupted. The cost
of uncertainty can far exceed the amount of penalties imposed by courts
or through settlements. This is consistent with both the capture and eco-
nomic theories.
C. Understanding Choice of Means
The eleven principles set out in the previous section do not embody
any particularly controversial or contested ideas about how agencies behave.
Although they are inconsistent with a pure public interest theory, serious
analyses of agency behavior have long ago abandoned such an approach.
Using these principles, we now turn to creating a framework to explain how
agencies choose among the means of regulation.
"Administrative law is constructed and reconstructed on the basis of
assumptions about how particular procedural arrangements will affect the
behavior and performance of government officials and organizations. '2 9 Ap-
plying our eleven principles to regulators' choice of means of regulating
allows us to draw several insights about agency behavior to test those as-
sumptions.
First, regulators will be more likely to act when it is possible to spread
the cost of their action across a large number of relatively powerless ac-
tors (consumers or producers) while concentrating the benefit of their ac-
tions on a relatively small number of actors. 22° Different means allow dif-
ferent degrees of cost spreading and so will produce different outcomes. For
example, the gains from the tobacco settlement are concentrated in a rela-
tively small number of state politicians and plaintiffs' attorneys. The cost
of the settlement is imposed on smokers worldwide. Outside the western
world it is unlikely that the typical smoker is aware of the settlement and
its costs; even inside the United States, smokers are relatively politically
powerless in most states because they are a diffuse, unorganized group.
Similarly, EPA's suit against the heavy-duty diesel engine producers in-
on regulation ideally matches lead time on product design.
219 Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 1113.
220 Principles I and 2, supra Part II.B.
20051
Harvard Environmental Law Review
volved a small number of engine producers and a large number of users
who purchase heavy-duty diesel engine-equipped trucks. The cost of EPA's
action would ultimately be spread across consumers of transportation
services and products whose production included transportation services
and diesel engine manufacturers. 211 If the cost per consumer is large enough,
consumer groups can overcome the cost of organizing, band together, and
deflect political efforts to impose costly regulation on the firms that sup-
ply them even when the number of firms is small. The high cost of orga-
nizing large numbers of consumers with diverse interests, however, will
give an advantage to the regulated firms in transferring the costs to the
consumers.
To predict the choice of means by regulators, we must therefore ex-
amine the relative cost for regulators of litigation, traditional rulemaking,
and negotiated rulemaking. 22 Our regulatory theory principles predict that
regulators will consider these costs in deciding how to act. 223 Litigation
involves relatively high costs per regulated entity, since formal proceed-
ings are required to deal with each. Similarly, negotiation costs rise as the
number of participants increases. On the other hand, traditional rulemak-
ing offers a lower cost per regulated entity since one proceeding covers all
firms. Thus regulation-by-litigation and regulation-by-negotiation are more
likely to be used when a small number of regulated entities are targeted.
Since regulators are more likely to act when benefits are concentrated and
costs are dispersed, 224 rulemaking will be the most frequent means of regu-
lating. Where an agency is imposing large costs on a small, organized
group, however, litigation will be preferable since it offers the agency the
opportunity to neutralize the natural advantage organized interest groups
have in contesting agency action.
Second, regulation-by-litigation may be used by agencies as a way
to separate normally allied interests. If an industry has organized against
past efforts at regulation, then successful suits attacking major firms in
the industry will disrupt the regulation-based cartel by creating incentives
for the firms to break ranks.225 Indeed, the bruised firms may become quiet
supporters of action against their competitors as they argue for a level
playing field. Litigation allows regulators to deal with firms individually,
preventing regulated entities from cooperating in responding to a regula-
tory initiative. Legal rules, such as those governing waiver of attorney-client
privilege, may also hamper cooperation among defendants.226 Regulation-
22' Exactly who bore the costs would depend on whether the engine manufacturers could
raise prices or not.
222 Principle 4, supra Part II.B.
223 Principle 7, supra Part 11.B.
224 Principles 1, 2, and 3, supra Part II.B.
225 Principles 9, 10, and 11, supra Part III.B.
226 There are work-arounds for such problems, such as joint defense strategies, but
these impose their own costs.
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by-negotiation, on the other hand, has the opposite effect, requiring co-
operation among the regulated in the negotiations. Where the regulated
do not share common interests, negotiations are more difficult. The nego-
tiations themselves also provide a device for inducing cooperation that
might not otherwise be possible because of antitrust considerations. Where
the regulator wishes to foster cooperation, it is more likely to choose regula-
tion-by-negotiation; where it wishes to hinder it, it is more likely to choose
regulation-by-litigation.
Third, regulation-by-litigation will be used by agencies when there
are resources that can be captured by the regulators from the regulated.
211
As there is little point in winning monetary settlements from bankrupt firms,
it is therefore less likely when firms are financially weak. Regulation-by-
litigation is thus more likely against profitable industries than against
economically weak ones. In addition, success in litigation offers a means
to signal an agency's fidelity to interest groups. 22 The announcement of
large civil penalties telegraphs to important constituents the fact that en-
forcement actions are being taken.2 2 9 The amount of the settlements can be
seen as trophies by those who favor regulation. 230 Regulation-by-rulemaking,
on the other hand, hardly makes headlines once the rules are in place, are
operating, and the announcement of complex rules is harder (but not im-
possible) to package for the media. Further, regulation-by-negotiation opens
an agency to charges of capture by spoiler groups.
23
'
Fourth, regulation-by-litigation will be used when it is politically ad-
vantageous to achieve a more permanent impact on the targeted firms or
industry. A change in administration can interrupt and even reverse regu-
lations that are in an agency's regulatory pipeline on the way to becom-
ing final. 23 2 By comparison, the political costs to a new president of calling
off litigators in the midst of court proceedings, requiring a public reversal
227 Keep in mind our distinction between regulation-by-litigation and civil enforcement
actions involving existing substantive rules. The latter also generate positive headlines for
regulators but do not involve imposing new substantive requirements, merely bringing
noncompliant actors into compliance.
221 Principles 5 and 6, supra Part III.B. See also Jonathan H. Adler, Bean Counting for
a Better Earth: Environmental Enforcement at EPA, REGULATION, Spring 1998, at 40, 48
("[W]ork that produces high profile outcomes tends to drive out work that produces little
noticed outcomes. If enforcement goes down, EPA risks being attacked by environmental
groups or politicians for being 'soft' on polluters.").
22 See, e.g., EPA Set Enforcement Records in 1999, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 21, 2000
(quoting EPA Administrator Carol Browner: "This year's enforcement statistics again send
a strong signal that we will unfailingly take action against those who illegally pollute the
environment of our country"), available at 2000 WL 7838025.
230 See, e.g., Attorney General Janet Reno's comments on announcing the penalties against
the diesel engine manufacturers, discussed in Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at
509 n.590 and associated text.
231 See Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest
Groups, 53 C.W.R.U. L. REV. 315, 327-28 (2002) (describing spoiler role played by na-
tional environmental groups to protect national lobbyists' turf).
232 See Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 66, at 590-94 (describing how Bush
Administration reversed Clinton Administration policies on mining).
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of positions taken in official court filings, will often be higher than the
costs of changing course in a rulemaking. 233 Changing positions in a
rulemaking involves changing a judgment call among plausible alterna-
tives. Changing positions in litigation, at least for the public, involves chang-
ing positions on what "the law" says-a harder position to sustain publicly.
Fifth, regulation-by-litigation is a way for regulators to close the door
to interests who might wish to make their views known in a traditional regu-
latory process or even in a regulation-by-negotiation process. Unlike a notice
and comment rulemaking procedure, regulation-by-litigation does not guar-
antee all interests the opportunity to be heard in the regulatory process.
The government and defendants selected by the government are parties;
all others must seek permission to intervene to present their positions and
evidence. Courts need not grant such permission, and often do not.234 Al-
though agencies can close interests out of regulation-by-negotia-tion, they
are vulnerable to suits over the exclusion and challenges from excluded
interests in the rulemaking that follows the negotiations.
Sixth, regulation-by-negotiation is most likely to be used when the
agency seeks to facilitate interest group bargaining over relatively minor
adjustments to existing regulatory schemes. By inviting interest groups into
the process before drafting the rule, the agency cedes considerable con-
trol of the agenda, trading off bargaining power for the involvement of the
interest groups. By allowing each group to hold the final negotiated product
hostage to each group's veto, the agency makes credible interest group
commitments easier.235
To summarize, once they decide to regulate, agencies have three alter-
native means of regulation: regulation-by-rulemaking, regulation-by-negotia-
tion, and regulation-by-litigation. Each offers a different set of advantages
and disadvantages for regulators, regulated entities, and society generally.
The choice of means is largely left to the regulators, so where the social
costs and benefits of various forms of regulation diverge from the regulators'
costs and benefits, regulators may choose a socially inappropriate means
of regulation.
211 Of course, reversals of any policy can cause political fallout. See, e.g., Editorial,
Protecting the Everglades, PATRIOT-NEWS (Pa.), June 2, 2002, at F4 ("The Bush admini-
stration has had a rather woeful record on the environment up to this point, it being all too
eager to reverse Clinton administration policies that sought to preserve the best of Amer-
ica's natural world that is still unprotected."); Editorial, Choking on the Air in Yellowstone
Park, PENSACOLA NEWS J. (Fla.), Mar. 8, 2002, at 8A (commenting on reversal of Clinton
policy on snowmobiles in Yellowstone that "[t]he degree to which the Bush administration
is clueless on environmental policy is revealed more starkly than anywhere else in the debate
over snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park").
234 In the diesel regulation litigation described supra note 134, the truck manufacturers
association was denied permission to intervene, for example.
235 Principle 8, supra Part IIIB.
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IV. EXPLAINING EPA's CHOICES
We began this Article with a discussion of public choice theory and
principles that included a summary of major theories of regulation and a
review of regulatory process options that are available when a regulator
chooses to act. We emphasized the fact that decisions about regulation
are made by ordinary human beings, not angels or devils. We pointed out
that public choice assumes that all people, whether they are politicians,
bureaucrats, professors, or supermarket employees, seek to maximize their
own well-being when making choices. In earlier work we examined in
detail the regulation of heavy-duty diesel engine emissions. 236 This case
study is ideal for testing our broader theory, as EPA and its predecessor
chose each of the four actions described above (no action, rulemaking,
negotiated rulemaking, and litigation) over the more than thirty years of
regulatory activity on diesel mobile source emissions. We first describe
the incentive structure for EPA under the CAA, necessary to understand
EPA's choices. We then use a highly abbreviated account of the regula-
tory history of diesel engine emissions, focusing on the choices the agen-
cies made in choosing when and how to act, 7 as a vehicle to analyze
agency choice of the means of regulation.
A. Lack of Action
The first national regulations dealing with heavy-duty diesel emis-
sions were issued under the Air Quality Act of 1967238 in 1968 to apply to
model year ("MY") 1970 engines and regulated the emission of "smoke"
as measured through an opacity test.239 An initial level was set for MY 1970-
MY1973 and a more stringent level for MY1974 and beyond. 240 Relative
to other sources, the initial round of regulation paid little attention to
heavy-duty diesel engines. The passage of the CAA Amendments of 1970
and the creation of EPA by President Richard Nixon that same year changed
the regulatory climate. Federal authority was enhanced at the expense of the
states. 24' At the same time, environmental quality became an important
national political issue, with both the Nixon Administration and presumed
1972 Democratic presidential candidate Senator Edmund Muskie jockeying
for advantage on the issue.242
236 See Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14.
237 For convenience and to minimize the length of this Article, we cite only to our ear-
lier case study for the facts in this section. The interested reader is referred to that article
for original source for the facts we provide here.
238 Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
239 33 Fed. Reg. 8304, 8305 (June 4, 1968).
240 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 460-62.
241 Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMEN-
TALISM 263, 282-85 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000).
242 Id.
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The new regulatory framework reserved mobile source emission stan-
dards to the federal government (except for California, which already had
a regulatory program in effect).243 EPA tightened the MY1974 standards
for diesels, adding emissions standards for CO, NO x, and hydrocarbons
to the "smoke" standard.2 " Although EPA's MY1974 regulations were
more stringent than their Department of Health, Education and Welfare
("HEW") predecessors, they were less stringent than those applied to auto-
mobiles .245
Diesel emissions were virtually ignored in early federal air pollution
regulatory efforts because the gains from regulating them were slight. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, heavy-duty diesel engines played a com-
paratively small role in mobile source emissions in the United States. For
example, in 1970, diesel trucks made up only 2.45% of trucks in use.
2 46
In contrast, by the late 1990s diesels made up over 90% of trucks" in use
in the heavy-duty segment. 247 Diesels thus accounted for only a small frac-
tion of total 1970 emissions-1.75% of particulates, 0.02% of CO, 1.9%
of hydrocarbons, 4.8% of NO x, and 0.4% of SOQ. 2 4 8 The gains from regu-
latory activity by EPA and HEW were thus small. Because of the small
proportion of diesel engines among mobile sources, even large reductions
in diesel emissions would only marginally reduce mobile source or total
emissions. It is not surprising, therefore, that EPA and HEW focused
their attention elsewhere, with their first step to reduce visible emissions
("smoke"). Moreover, both EPA and HEW had large competing demands
on their resources. The passage of multiple new national regulatory stat-
utes, along with the creation of EPA itself, meant that agency resources
were scarce. Devoting them to regulating a minor contributor to air pollu-
tion would not have been a rational allocation of scarce agency resources,
and the comparative neglect of heavy-duty diesel emissions in the first
rounds of national mobile source emissions is thus unsurprising.
243 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 462-63. See also Clean Air Act, Pub.
L. No 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
244 Id. at 463-64. See also Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
245 Id. at 463.
246 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SERVICE, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION,
CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR CARBON MONOXIDE, NITROGEN OXIDE, AND HYDROCARBON
EMISSIONS FROM MOBILE SOURCES 2-4, Table 2-1 (1970).
247 CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, DIESEL TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
10 (2000), available at http://www.dieselforum.org/enews/downloads/DTF-Economic-Study.
pdf (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
248 N. A. Henein, Diesel Engines Combustion and Emissions, in ENGINE EMISSIONS:
POLLUTANT FORMATION AND MEASUREMENT 211, 211 (George S. Springer & Donald J.
Patterson eds., 1973).
[Vol. 29
Choosing How To Regulate
B. Regulating by Rulemaking in the 1970s and 1980s
Four crucial features of the post-1970 regulatory framework affected
EPA's subsequent regulatory choices. First, the CAA required EPA to
establish air quality standards for specific pollutants. 249 Regions that failed
to attain these stardards were disadvantaged in several ways, including
the potential loss of federal highway funds250 and reduced future economic
growth due to more stringent pollution control restrictions. 25 Second, the
statute distinguished between regulation of mobile and stationary sources,
giving EPA effective control of emission level from the former and states
substantially more authority over emissions from the latter.2 12 Third, EPA
chose, not unreasonably, to rely on air quality modeling rather than actual
air quality measurement to evaluate the effectiveness of air quality meas-
ures. 21 Performance in the model, rather than actual performance, thus be-
came critical for the agency.25 4 Fourth, EPA chose to regulate heavy-duty
engines by testing engines in laboratories under specified conditions rather
than through measurements of actual emissions on the road. 255 Techno-
logical and cost constraints can explain EPA's decision-heavy-duty die-
sel engines are expensive and road testing capabilities were limited in the
early 1970s.
The 1977 CAA explicitly required EPA to substantially tighten die-
sel emissions standards, 25 6 a result that benefited a potent coalition of the
automobile manufacturers, stationary sources, and states looking for re-
ductions in emissions to allow economic growth. At the same time, the 1977
amendments made changes favorable to the automobile industry, post-
poning more stringent standards for cars. 25 7 The new diesel requirements
partially offset the impact of the delays in auto standards. Congress also
imposed a significant constraint on EPA, requiring a four-year lead time
for new mobile source emission standards. 258 Despite the 1977 Amendments
requirement of increased regulation, EPA continued to drag its feet on
issuing standards for heavy-duty diesels; ultimately the Natural Resources
Defense Council successfully sued to force EPA to issue final NO X and
249 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2000).
250 Id. at § 7407(d)(l)(A)(i).
211 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 408.
2521d. at 412-15.
253 Id. at 415-21.254 Id. at 415-21.
255 Id. at 452-53.
256 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14 at 465-67 and n.336 (quoting Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977 (Pub. L. No. 95-5), 91 Stat. 685, 765 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 7521 (1994)).257 Id. at 465.
258 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(C) (2000) ("Any standard promulgated or revised under this
paragraph and applicable to classes or categories of heavy-duty vehicles or engines shall
apply for a period of no less than 3 model years beginning no earlier than the model year
commencing 4 years after such revised standard is promulgated.").
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particulate standards. 2 9 Again, EPA's lack of action is an understandable
result of the agency's allocation of resources. Heavy-duty diesel emis-
sions were simply not a large enough problem to warrant the investment
of agency resources when compared to other priorities. However, as the
proportion of diesel engines in heavy-duty vehicles grew2" (largely due
to lower operating costs compared to gasoline engines) and other mobile
source emissions were reduced, heavy-duty diesel emissions began to be
a larger proportion of total emissions.261 Over time, therefore, the gains to
EPA of reducing heavy-duty diesel emissions grew and EPA's willingness
to invest political capital and resources in regulating them also grew.
EPA's choice of rulemaking in the 1970s and 1980s is readily explained:
it was the only option the agency had at that time. There was no reason
for EPA to look for alternatives, however, as rulemaking was well suited
to the type of regulatory activity EPA was engaged in.
EPA's regulatory choices had important consequences for the future.
For a variety of technical reasons, described in detail in our earlier arti-
cle,2 62 heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers reduced emissions through
controlling combustion rather than by adding on external control devices,
as was done with automobiles and catalytic converters.263 This increased
control over combustion provided engine manufacturers with the ability
to enhance customer-desired characteristics of the engines (chiefly in-
creased mileage) as well as reducing emissions." In particular, because
of the highly structured nature of the emissions testing required by EPA,
engine manufacturers were able to optimize engines for mileage outside the
EPA test cycle and optimize them for emissions control within the test cy-
259 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 473. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC 1953 (D.D.C. 1984), available at 1984 WL 6092 (cited in 6 ENVTL.
LAW 309, 403, n.876).
260 Morris, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 473-74.
261 See 46 Fed. Reg. 1910 (Jan. 7, 1981):
As diesel engines continue over time to power an even greater portion of the na-
tion's heavy-duty vehicles (on-the-road trucks and buses whose gross vehicle weight
rating exceeds 8,500 pounds), their contribution to ambient levels of total sus-
pended particulate (TSP) will increase over levels that are already significant. Cur-
rent heavy-duty diesels emit more than twice the particulate per mile emitted by
heavy-duty gasoline engines operated on leaded gasoline.
See also John H. Cushman, Jr., Record Penalty Likely Against Diesel Makers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1998, at Al:
Environmentalists and Government officials say diesel engines were passed over
in emission standards until the 1990's because they caused much less smog than
did cars and smokestack industries. But since car emissions of hydrocarbons and
nitrogen oxide began to be regulated in 1970, diesel engines have increasingly
emerged as a greater problem.
262 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 437-42.
263 Id. at 437-38.
264 Id. at 439-40.
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cle.2 65 These impacts on technology became important in the mid-1990s,
as we describe below.
C. Negotiated Rulemaking over the Noncompliance Penalties
As emissions standards tightened in the 1980s and 1990s, meeting
them became more costly and more difficult for the engine manufactur-
ers. Because failing to meet the standards could result in loss of certification
for an engine, a potential death sentence for an engine manufacturer, the
engine manufacturers sought flexibility from EPA in meeting tightened
standards. EPA introduced several provisions allowing delays to accom-
modate economic circumstances and the need for lead time.2 66 Most im-
portantly, EPA created "noncompliance penalties" ("NCPs") that allowed
engine manufacturers to continue to sell engines which did not meet emis-
sions standards in return for payment of fines. 2 67 This provision resulted
from EPA's first use of negotiated rulemaking, with agreement on the rule
reached in four months. 268 Sale of an engine with an NCP required findings
by the EPA that the standard had become more difficult to meet, that sub-
stantial work was required to meet the standard, and that a technological
laggard was likely to exist. 269
Why use negotiated rulemaking for the NCP rule? One reason was that
EPA generally was an early and enthusiastic adopter of negotiated rule-
making. 27" Another was that those within EPA favoring a hard line against
industry would have had little bargaining power, since the Reagan Admini-
stration was generally unsympathetic to increasing regulatory burdens.
More importantly, we think, is that the NCP rule fits the profile of a rule
where benefits of negotiated rulemaking are highest. The NCP rule was
essentially a negotiation over how much the industry would have to pay
to exceed the standards. Congress and the Administration were unlikely to
allow EPA to set standards that would prevent any U.S. engine manufac-
turer from selling engines. EPA thus had little to lose by allowing an es-
cape valve and something to gain-reduced opposition to tighter stan-
dards and political capital from generating funds. The main obstacle for
EPA was the opposition of environmental pressure groups, who had to be
convinced that EPA had not "given away the store" in setting the penal-
ties. The negotiated rulemaking setting allowed the industry to credibly
convey financial information to the environmental groups to prove it had
not gotten "too good" a deal from EPA.
265 Id. at 442.
266 Id. at 476.
267 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14 at 476 n.401, quoting 50 Fed. Reg.
35,374 (Aug. 30, 1985).
268 Id. at 476-77.
269 Id. at 477 n.405 and associated text, quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 35,375 (Aug. 30, 1985).
210 Id. at 477.
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D. Rulemaking in the 1990s
The CAA was amended again in 1990, again tightening standards for
heavy-duty diesels (as well as other mobile sources) and introducing die-
sel fuel regulations.2 1' Two important developments changed EPA's atti-
tude toward heavy-duty diesel emissions. First, by the 1990s, heavy-duty
diesel emissions had become the largest part of overall mobile source emis-
sions of NOx and particulates, 27 2 largely because of the stringency of auto-
mobile regulation. Second, scientists had begun to view diesel emissions
as more dangerous than they had previously believed. 273 To set the new
standards under the 1990 Amendments, EPA returned to rulemaking.
This choice is not surprising. Mobile source regulations generally,
and heavy-duty diesel regulations in particular, are technology forcing
regulations, which do not depend on the industry's current ability to meet
the standard. 274 Indeed, the technology forcing approach was the result of
Congressional distrust of mobile source manufacturers' claims about techno-
logical feasibility. 275 The strength of negotiated rulemaking, the credible
transmission of information, was thus not an important part of the stan-
dard setting. Moreover, by the 1990s, the tradeoff of reductions from various
sources had become more obvious. The large number of regions out of com-
pliance with EPA standards meant that there was a premium on additional
reductions in mobile sources, which could only come from EPA. 276 (States'
authority over mobile sources was largely limited to the politically infea-
sible imposition of use restrictions.) 277
E. Negotiating Principles
EPA returned to negotiations (although not to formal negotiated rule-
making) in 1995 to create a "Statement of Principles" for the future regu-
lation of heavy-duty diesel engines.27 Negotiating with the California Air
Resources Board ("CARB") and the engine manufacturers, EPA created a
framework intended to provide greater stability in regulation. 279 The engine
271 Id. at 478-79.
272 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14 at 479 n.421, citing Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL. LAW 309, 341 (2000).
273 Id. at 479 n.422, citing Kathleen M. Nauss & the HIE Diesel Working Group, Criti-
cal Issues in Assessing the Carcinogenicity of Diesel Exhaust: A Synthesis of Current,
Knowledge, in HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE, DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
EMISSIONS, EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 7 (1995).
214 ld. at 421-24.
275 Id. at 421.
276 Id. at 428.
277 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14 at 412-13.
27 Id. at 480 n.423, citing Control of Air Pollution from Heavy-Duty Engines, Appen-
dix: Statement of Principles, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,580, 45,602-04 (proposed Aug. 31, 1995) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80, 86, and 89).
279 Id. at 480-81.
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manufacturers agreed to a substantial reduction in NO, in exchange for
an agreement by EPA to not reduce particulate standards and from CARB
to delay further reductions in NOx.2 8 As in the earlier NCP negotiated
rulemaking, EPA had little to lose by negotiating. Since the issue was trading
off particulate and NO x reductions, the credible transmission of informa-
tion by the engine manufacturers was important. Moreover, there were
important gains available for the engine manufacturers from obtaining a
joint agreement from CARB and EPA, ensuring consistent standards.
Those gains could be used by EPA and CARB to gain greater reductions
than they could get the engine manufacturers to accept individually.2 1' The
Statement of Principles proved less worthwhile than the engine manufac-
turers had hoped, as EPA later reneged.
28 2
F Litigating Defeat Devices
By the mid-1990s, EPA had a serious NO x emissions problem. Die-
sel emissions were not declining outside the model, as EPA had thought
they would in response to the emissions regulations issued after passage
of the 1990 CAA Amendments. 283 Higher atmospheric levels of NO, meant
more regions were out of compliance with EPA's ozone standard; reduc-
ing NO x levels would improve compliance in EPA's emissions model,
although not necessarily in reality.284 EPA's emissions models in the
1990s under-predicted heavy-duty diesel emissions in part because "little
effort has been made to describe truck travel explicitly within travel de-
mand models. In current modeling practice, it is common to estimate
heavy-duty truck travel as a fixed percentage of predicted traffic volumes"
despite differences in traffic patterns from light duty traffic. 28 Moreover,
the models misestimated the NOx-ozone relationship, ignoring evidence
that under some conditions decreasing NO x emissions increased ozone
levels. 286
In 1998, EPA filed suit against the seven U.S. heavy-duty engine manu-
facturers, alleging that they had used electronic engine controllers as "de-
2 80 Id.
281 The agencies could always impose reductions but the engine manufacturers could
challenge the reductions in court.
282 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 480-81 n.429, quoting Ralph Kisiel,
Cloud Hovers Over Proposed Diesel Rules, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, at 34.283 Id. at 481.
284 Id. at 419.
285 David B. Dreher & Robert A. Harley, A Fuel-Based Inventory for Heavy-Duty Die-
sel Truck Emissions, 48 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. Assoc. 352, 352 (1998) (footnote omit-
ted). One estimate based on fuel consumption put on-road NO, emissions at twice what
EPA predicted in 1996. Andrew J. Kean, Robert F. Sawyer, & Robert A. Harley, A Fuel
Based Assessment of Off-Road Diesel Engine Emissions, 50 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. Assoc.
1929, 1937 (2000).
286 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 409 nn.79, 80.
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feat devices. ' 287 In short, EPA claimed that the engine manufacturers had
programmed the engine controllers to recognize the EPA test protocol
conditions and to minimize emissions of regulated pollutants under those
conditions. 288 When the controller determined that the engine was not in
the test cycle, it was programmed to maximize mileage, resulting in higher
emissions. 289 EPA's claims presented the engine manufacturers with a se-
rious problem. If EPA prevailed in its enforcement action against them, they
would owe substantial penalties for the engines already sold. 29 ° More impor-
tantly, if EPA took the position that the engine controllers in the engines
for MY 1999 were also illegal defeat devices, it could deny the engine manu-
facturers the certifications they needed to sell engines. While it was unlikely
that EPA could successfully deny certifications to all seven U.S. engine
manufacturers, 29 if a few broke ranks, EPA could shut down some. As exist-
ing market trends pointed toward a consolidation in the industry, even a
temporary loss of certification could be devastating for individual firms. 292
The engine manufacturers were thus in a classic prisoner's dilemma-
regardless of what other firms did, each was better off cooperating with
EPA. 293 If no other firm cooperated, the first to capitulate would benefit from
a head start in selling compliant engines. If other firms cooperated, a
holdout would be shut out of the market. Table 1 puts the firms' choices
in prisoner's dilemma format, with the higher utility choices in boldface.
The upper-left cell, where all firms cooperate, gives the equilibrium solu-
tion.
287 Id. at 481-82. A "defeat device" is just what the name implies, a device to defeat
the regulations.
288 Id. at 483.
289 Id. at 483.
290 Id. at 509-10.
291 The U.S. heavy-duty engine market was dominated by U.S. manufacturers. More
recently, and partly in response to EPA's actions, foreign engine manufacturers have started
to sell significant numbers of engines in the U.S. market. See Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak,
supra note 14, at 450-55.
292 Id. at 507.
293 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 9 (1984) ("The Prisoner's
Dilemma is simply an abstract formulation of situations in which what is best for each
person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would have been better off
with mutual cooperation.").
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TABLE 1: FIRM RESPONSE TO EPA SUIT AS PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Firm A
Other Firms Cooperate with EPA Refuse to Cooperate
with EPA
Cooperate Firm A: existing market Firm A: EPA refuses
with EPA share unchanged, pay certification, sales 0
penalty Other firms: Market
Other firms: existing share increased as sell to
market share unchanged, A's customers, pay pen-
pay penalty alty
Refuse to Firm A: Gain market Firm A: existing market
Cooperate share, pay penalty share unchanged, pay
with EPA Other firms: EPA refuses litigation costs and
certification, sales 0 possible penalty
Other firms: existing
market share unchanged,
pay litigation costs and
possible penalty
Thus, even if the engine manufacturers thought they were likely to pre-
vail against EPA in the enforcement action, and they had good reason to
think so,294 EPA's ability to deny certification for the coming year's en-
gines, which would force the engine manufacturers to litigate the denial
of certification as well as defend the enforcement action, meant that a
decision to resist would amount to a bet of the entire company. Prudent di-
rectors could hardly agree to such a bet, even if the chance of losing the
litigation on the merits were small. Not surprisingly, then, the engine manu-
facturers settled just as the October deadline for certification of the next
year's engines arrived. 9
5
In the October 1998 consent decrees that settled the enforcement ac-
tions, the engine manufacturers agreed to "pull ahead" the MY2004 regu-
lations to MY2002 engines, something EPA could not have directly im-
posed because of the CAA's lead time rules.29 6 The settlements also added
294 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 483-86. EPA's settlement of the suits
and defense of the consent decrees against environmental pressure groups' complaints that
the settlements were too weak included admissions that EPA was far from certain to pre-
vail in the enforcement actions. See Mem. of Law of the U.S. in Supp. of Mot. to Enter
Consent Decree and Respond to Pub. Comments at 36-37, United States v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civ. No 1:98-2544 HHK) ("EPA Settlement Br.").
295 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 488-93.
296 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(6) (2000).
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new test protocols to the existing set of federal test protocols, another
change that likely would have been barred by the lead time rules.297 The
engine manufacturers agreed to a "Low NO x Rebuild Program" to improve
emissions from existing engines and to a number of steps to offset the
greater emissions existing engines produced over the predicted emissions
EPA had used in modeling.2 9 8
Proceeding by litigation in this instance offered EPA significant gains
over proceeding by traditional or negotiated rulemaking. First, EPA was
able to secure substantive regulations (the "pull ahead" of the MY2004
standards and revision of the test protocols) that it would not have been
able to impose in rulemaking and for which it would have had to pay a
high price in negotiations. By shifting substantial bargaining power to
itself through both the threat of financial penalties and denial of certification
for future engines, EPA gained substantively through using litigation. The
settlement process also maximized EPA's leverage by eliminating objections
from the engine manufacturers to the outcome (to which they agreed in
advance, in a binding fashion unlike the result of negotiated rulemaking)
and reduced the role of environmental pressure groups. 299 EPA, and the
Clinton-Gore Administration, also secured favorable publicity for being
"tough" on environmental issues,3°° an important campaign theme for Vice
President Gore's 2000 campaign for president.
In short, EPA needed to act in 1998. Suits and petitions from north-
eastern states that risked being placed in nonattainment status added ur-
gency to the stimulus. Political benefits from signaling a tough stance on
polluters led agency leaders to trumpet their support for stricter emission
regulations. A difficult presidential campaign lay ahead, and the politics
and the "get tough" policy of EPA's enforcement division call for action
could be communicated broadly at low cost. Many factors constrained EPA's
actions and choice of regulatory process, among them the legal and other
constraints that placed the engine manufacturers out of the reach of regu-
lation-by-rulemaking, the number and size of firms to be regulated, the dif-
fuse nature of consumers who would bear the cost of EPA's final action
against producers, and the extent to which the political action could ex-
tract payments from firms.
297 Morris, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 490.
298 Id. at 490-91.
299 EPA noted in its filing seeking approval of the settlements that:
[T]he government did not conduct this negotiation as it does a rulemaking, bring-
ing all "stakeholders" to the table, and working out a solution in the same way
that they participated in the development of the emission standards .... While the
public has an opportunity to comment on a consent decree during the comment
period, it is neither feasible, necessary nor appropriate for the public to be present
in negotiations of the United States' claims against individual defendants.
EPA Settlement Br., supra note 294, at 38.
300 Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 508-09.
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Because EPA was blocked from a timely traditional regulatory solu-
tion by the combination of the lead-time provisions and its own earlier ac-
tions, regulation-by-litigation offered an advantage over traditional rule-
making or regulation-by-negotiation because controls could be imposed
sooner. With a favorable settlement, the agency could trumpet the prospects
of earlier improvements, no matter what the final accounting might be on
the net impact on NOx emissions or ozone levels once truck purchasers
reacted to EPA's actions. Since the model's predictions, rather than im-
provement in emissions, was all that mattered in the short-term, EPA could
ignore this effect until later. This, too, supported regulation-by-litigation.
The results of the litigation for air quality were ambiguous at best. The
MY2004 standards reduced emissions and the new test protocol required
engines operate to meet the standards under a greater range of conditions.3 0
The pull-ahead ensured that MY2002 and MY2004 engines would be
cleaner than they would otherwise. Heavy-duty diesel engines have a long
useful life,30 2 however, and the consent decree conditions also created an
enormous incentive to "pre-buy" engines before October 2001.303 Because
many customers were leery of the new technologies introduced to meet
the pull ahead, they bought more MY2001 engines than they would have
otherwise, substantially reducing the number of cleaner engines bought after
the new standards went into effect.3 The pre-buy was substantial and it is at
least arguable that the net impact of the consent decrees on air quality was
negative for a significant period of time.
The public interest theory predicts that regulators will seek to mini-
mize all costs taken together when developing and implementing a regu-
latory strategy. The economic theory says that regulators will seek to mini-
mize their cost when developing and implementing a strategy. The ex-
traction theory30 5 says regulators will seek remedies that generate tangi-
ble political rewards. The Bootlegger-Baptist theory predicts regulators
will be aided by groups that bring moral authority to their cause.
Using these theories can explain EPA's methods. Despite the various
constraints on the agency, EPA still had a choice when considering regu-
latory strategies for the regulation of heavy-duty diesel engines. Environ-
mental pressure groups, accustomed to using the courts in pursuit of their
interests, would predictably call for quick action to reduce emissions. They
301 Id. at 488-89.
302 Id. at 425.
303 Id. at 500-06. Interestingly, the provisions the mobile source regulations most re-
semble elsewhere in the CAA are the new source standards for stationary sources. As econo-
mist Lawrence White concluded, the mobile source "regulations have had the effects of
new source performance standards-differentially increasing the costs of new vehicles,
discouraging their purchase, and encouraging the retention of the older vehicles that are
the heavy emitters in the fleet." LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUT-
ANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES 68 (1982).
3o Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 14, at 500-02.
305 See generally McChesney, supra note 197.
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would support bringing suits against violators and penalize them. The
agency would evaluate the targeted firms. Could they pay penalties and
were they and their constituencies powerful enough politically to deflect
the agency's actions? A decision to use regulation-by-rulemaking could
be criticized by environmental pressure groups because of the delay in get-
ting results. On the other hand, regulation-by-litigation offered the attrac-
tion of bringing a timely outcome in a politically visible way. The diesel
engine producers and their constituencies apparently lacked the political
clout to deflect the action. And the risk diesel producers faced of losing the
EPA-granted authority for marketing the current crop of engines was more
than the industry could take on. The spreading of the costs of forcing change
in the diesel engine industry over all users of long distance truck trans-
portation, through higher engine and operating costs, concealed the im-
pact of EPA's actions from the public.
V. CONCLUSION
We have two sets of conclusions from our analysis. First, through
our examination of EPA's record in regulating heavy-duty diesel engines
in the context of our framework for understanding agency choice of means
of action, we can assess the appropriateness of one agency's specific choices.
Second, understanding how agencies regulate allows us to offer suggestions
on how they should regulate.
To evaluate either EPA's actions in the diesel regulation story or agency
action more generally, we must begin with the issue of whether the agency's
decision to regulate is appropriate. As we noted at the start, there are well-
documented incentives that lead agencies to regulate too often as well as
reasons why they might regulate too infrequently. We argued that the dan-
gers of too much regulation are treated as larger by the U.S. system than
the dangers of under-regulation. This leads us to both a general and a speci-
fic conclusion: regulation-by-litigation is used by agencies to over-regulate.
To see why this is so, we draw from a discussion of regulation-by-
litigation by Richard Epstein. He described two responses that might be
taken by a constitutional government to address harms imposed by some
members of the community on others against their will.30 6 The first re-
sponse he described called for a determination of the number being harmed
and, implicitly, the cost of their organizing common law suits against the
parties that had invaded their property rights, assuming, of course, a com-
mon law framework existed." 7 If private action were feasible, then there
would be no further role for the state. Epstein implied that government has a
responsibility to assist in defining and enforcing property rights. The provi-
sion of a system of justice for settling property rights disputes provides
306 See Epstein, in NEW WAVE, supra note 39, at 61-62.
307 Id. at 6 I.
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adequate protection of the public interest. Epstein went on in his com-
ment to consider briefly those situations where many unwilling individu-
als are harmed, situations where the collective harm is large but the indi-
vidual harm is too small to justify taking private action. 08 In these cases,
he suggested, government can act for the citizens, following a tradition that
relates to a "distinction between general and special damages as early as
1535.
309
Epstein moved from antiquity to the present, explaining that our mod-
ern interpretation of government calls for government to act in such cir-
cumstances. If, after proper deliberations among appropriately elected
officials, government fails to act, then government has failed.31° Under this
theory, any failure to intervene in the name of public health, no matter
the cost, is a failure to serve the public interest. Given that government
has failed, special interest groups that claim to be serving the public in-
terest move to the courts. As Epstein put it, "[so-called public health
positions are always going to get at least two bites at the apple. They, in
effect, have to win only one war; industries in defensive positions are
going to have to fight their battles over and over again." '' Epstein's dis-
cussion was focused on suits undertaken by state attorneys general in suits
against handgun and cigarette producers; the discussion was not about
the use of regulation-by-litigation by federal agencies in their pursuit of
firms or industries already regulated. But while this was not the focus of
Epstein's comments, it is still possible to glean something from them for
the case at hand.
In the specific case of regulation of heavy-duty diesel engines, it seems
clear enough that the harms imposed on individuals by diesel engine emis-
sions coming from trucks and other equipment are so small that no one per-
son or small group could justify organizing a suit against the emission
producers.3 2 We will not attempt to reach a judgment as to whether the col-
lective harms would justify action, assuming instead that that is the case.
Assuming that a case for general harm can be made, then, as Epstein sug-
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 62.
311 Epstein, in NEW WAVE, supra note 39, at 62.
312 Environmental pressure groups do bring citizen suits under a variety of environ-
mental laws seeking enforcement of permit terms against sources. The citizen suit provi-
sions are explicitly designed to overcome the collective action problem by providing attor-
neys' fees for the victorious group and eliminating the requirement to show direct harm to
the plaintiff's property or person. They thus arguably provide incentives for too much liti-
gation. Citizen suits do not, however, lead to substantive regulatory changes, merely to
enforcement of existing regulations. See generally Daniel J. Dunn, Environmental Citizen
Suits Against Natural Resource Companies, 17 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 161 (2003) (discussing
how citizen suits are used); Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of
Citizen and Taxpayer Suits, 6(2) GREEN BAG 17 (2002) (arguing citizen and taxpayer suits
should be routinely allowed in equity and that current standing law is mistaken). Hyper-
sensitive individuals could also arguably make claims as well.
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gested, 13 government can act for the harmed individuals. The passage of
the CAA and its amendments is the first result. The regulations affecting
diesel engine emissions that evolved from the statute is the continuing result.
When Congress debated the statute, the affected industry and all other inter-
ested parties had access to the debate. When EPA engaged in regulation-
by-rulemaking and regulation-by-negotiation, the industry and all other
interested parties had access to the regulatory process and to the courts if
the regulatory process was seen as being improper. Everyone had the
same number of bites at the apple. In the process, some modicum of regula-
tory certainty was assured for the industry and for all who favored stricter
standards. The process was transparent to the participants and to the moni-
tors of the regulatory process in the legislative and executive branches.
EPA's decision to litigate in 1998 did not necessarily represent a second
bite at the apple for those who support cleaner air. It was a fresh bite by
the regulator. EPA, as a regulator, faced a political challenge. On the one
hand, the northeastern states facing the cost of nonattainment status de-
manded action, and the administration wished to be recognized as being
tough on polluters in the run-up to the 2000 elections. EPA also had to
recognize that its own past estimates of improvements in air quality were
faulty and played a role in creating the crisis. If EPA recognized that the
problem stemmed from its faulty predictions and modeling and granted
relief to the upwind states, it would anger northeastern state voters, whose
states would then require increased stationary source restrictions, and
look soft on pollution nationally. If it attempted to reduce restrictions on
both the northeastern states and the upwind states, it would anger "envi-
ronmental" voters. If it required tighter stationary source controls in up-
wind states, there would be important political costs to pay there. Mobile
source regulation offered a way out of this dilemma. On the other hand, EPA
was constrained by the regulatory process from taking swift action through
issuing new standards by the lead time restrictions and the impact of fleet
turnover.
By employing regulation-by-litigation, EPA took a bite from the ap-
ple it had been forbidden to eat. Circumventing the lead time restrictions,
EPA was able to do what Congress had said it could not and tighten mo-
bile source emissions standards sooner than it could through regulation-
by-rulemaking. Environmental pressure groups would be happy with the
"tough" action and northeastern states would get relief as the model pre-
dicted lower emissions from the stricter emissions standards, while up-
wind states would not be required to reduce their emissions. The solution
was "win-win" for everyone except the consumers of heavy-duty diesel en-
gines and firms that made or used the engines. In other words, the politi-
cal benefits were concentrated on environmental pressure groups and state
313 See Epstein, in NEW WAVE, supra note 39, at 61 (discussing several justifications
for government regulatory action).
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regulators, while the costs were spread among essentially all consumers,
since transportation services affect most products. Moreover, by employ-
ing litigation, the agency insulated its regulatory action from changes in the
political control of the executive branch. A new administration might
consider rolling back a regulation but it would be unlikely to return to court
to seek to reduce the burdens of a "voluntary" settlement agreed to by
sources alleged to have committed significant wrongdoing.
The cost of this episode cannot be reckoned in terms of the magni-
tude of the cash portion of the settlement, which was a transfer from the
owners of the diesel engine producers to the federal government. Nor can
it be reckoned just in terms of its effects on the cost of diesel engines and
related effects on transportation and other activities powered by large diesel
engines. These are clearly costs to consider, and to be minimized if pos-
sible. The more serious cost of the diesel regulation-by-litigation relates
to the integrity of the regulatory process itself and the effect of regulation-
by-litigation on the behavior of participants in future regulatory episodes.
This leads us to our general conclusion. The problems with regulation-
by-litigation in the diesel engine case are the result of the agency having a
choice of how to proceed. Since agencies will choose regulation-by-litiga-
tion only when the net benefits to them of doing so exceed the net benefits
of proceeding by regulation-by-rulemaking or regulation-by-negotiation,
an important reason for agencies to choose litigation over their alternatives
is that litigation allows them to evade constraints imposed on them by the
other branches of government. Evading those constraints may appear
justified to agency litigators, particularly where the constraints appear to
be the result of political compromises of a questionable nature. How could
an agency lawyer not see, for example, outwitting a constraint imposed
by a powerful Congressperson seen as in the pocket of a polluting indus-
try as a good outcome?
But good intentions are not enough. We do not allow agencies to pick
and choose which Congressional mandates and Executive Orders they will
follow, despite good reason to believe that some of each of these are the
result of political sausage making that is best left unexamined. We give
effect to even restrictions of questionable moral or substantive legitimacy
because the delegation of authority to administrative agencies is tenable
only if we allow the political process the means of ultimate control over
them. Regulation-by-litigation is a means for escaping those constraints and
is thus a problem for the democratic legitimacy of agency action.
How troubling is the rise of regulation-by-litigation? Although EPA's
recent employment of regulation-by-litigation has set a new precedent in
the already controversial annals of federal regulation, it is still used only
in a small fraction of that agency's exertion of regulatory power. Yet we
have no reason to predict that regulation-by-litigation will end any time
soon. Indeed, the public choice logic we have employed to explain this epi-
sode suggests that when the conditions that triggered EPA's use of litiga-
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tion in the diesel engine case arise again, then regulation-by-litigation will
just as surely emerge again unless this form of regulation is precluded by
congressional action. Given the widespread violation of the complex regula-
tions issued by regulatory agencies,"4 something that the rules' complex-
ity and breadth make almost impossible to avoid, regulators have many
opportunities to use regulation-by-litigation.
How might the problems of regulation-by-litigation be contained?
We suggest two first steps. First, we already have a model of how agen-
cies can be constrained through reporting requirements in the various execu-
tive orders that force agencies to make clear the impact of their actions.'
This technique could be used on settlements, by requiring agencies to
certify to the legislature and the executive branches that the terms of any
settlement they propose to a court does not require actions they could not
impose directly through the exercise of their rulemaking powers. This
step alone would have precluded the tobacco and diesel settlements, since
state attorneys general lacked the authority to increase tobacco taxes and
EPA lacked the authority to order the pull-ahead of the MY2004 standards.
Second, courts could be empowered to reject settlements between agen-
cies and private parties that impose substantive requirements the agencies
lack authority to impose directly, with members of the legislature granted
standing to challenge settlements on such terms. This ensures that agencies
truthfully report the impact of their settlements.
Would the world be a better place if such restrictions on regulation-
by-litigation existed? In the tobacco case, the settlement likely would not
have been possible without the funding from the "tax" it created. State
attorneys general would have had to litigate the merits of their claims
against the tobacco companies. Had the states prevailed, something that
was by no means certain, the tobacco companies would likely have been
bankrupted by the damages. Had the tobacco companies prevailed, anti-
smoking advocates would have had to turn to the political process to seek
further restrictions on smoking. In the diesel case, if EPA had prevailed,
it would have had to find alternative ways for the diesel engine compa-
nies to reduce emissions. One obvious means of doing so would be to re-
quire them to fund programs to buy and retire older, more heavily pollut-
ing vehicles. Such a program would have increased demand for newer vehi-
cles, rather than decreasing it as the settlement did. Cleaner air quality
sooner would thus have been the result. If EPA had lost, it would have had to
find alternative ways to resolve the ozone noncompliance problem, either
through inducing voluntary reductions or paying the political price for
mandating them. Preventing the attorneys general and EPA from regulat-
" See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36, at 767 ("[T]he net result of regulatory accre-
tion may be that many regulated entities do not know-and cannot ensure practically-that
they are fully in compliance.").
31- See id. at 780-81 (describing pre-decisional review and justification requirements
imposed by both Congress and the federal executive branch).
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ing through litigation would thus not have prevented either from seeking
to change the behavior in question but only forced the regulators to pay
the political cost of doing so directly.
In the final analysis, the question of the desirability of allowing regula-
tion-by-litigation to continue turns on the reader's view of the desirabil-
ity of agency action. If the main problem is, as many in the regulatory
community appear to believe, that agencies fail to act often enough, leav-
ing people at risk from the behavior of private actors, then the various
obstacles to regulatory action imposed by constitutions, legislatures, and
executive branches are hurdles to be jumped or circumvented. If, however,
agency action is not presumptively desirable, then creating alternative
paths around those hurdles is problematic. As we described above, there is
no reason to grant agency action favored status relative to agency inaction.
Agencies act for a variety of motives, both legitimate and illegitimate.
Keeping agencies "on the track," and so forcing them to jump the hurdles
that may prevent regulatory activity in some cases, is thus important be-
cause it protects society from over-regulation. If those hurdles are too
high, the remedy is to lower them, not to create a new path around them.
Regulation-by-negotiation presents a different set of issues. Negoti-
ated rulemaking was initially touted as a means of lowering transaction
costs and increasing regulatory quality. Its record casts doubt on the ro-
bustness of those claims. Our analysis suggests its major role is to offer a
means of credible information transfer from the regulated to interest groups
seeking additional regulatory activity and to promote cooperation among
regulated entities. There are times when such impacts have a net positive
social impact. The NCP negotiations, for example, which mitigated the
problems caused by earlier rulemaking much more rapidly than if envi-
ronmental pressure groups had not been convinced that the penalties were
sufficiently high to deter deliberate noncompliance, produced an outcome
that appears to be a net social gain. Although the negotiated Statement of
Principles ("SOP") reduced the zone of disagreement over the future di-
rection of regulatory effort, its goals were too lofty and the constraints it
imposed too weak to provide a credible long-term commitment by the
agency. Not surprisingly, EPA reneged on the SOP only a few years later by
filing the defeat device suits.
The theoretical problem posed by regulation-by-negotiation is that it
will inappropriately serve as the environmental version of the New Deal's
NRA, inducing cartel-like behavior. The fragility of the negotiated rule-
making process, which prevents it from delivering its claimed benefits of
lower costs and higher quality, makes such cartels unlikely to be durable,
as the SOP experience revealed. The other danger of regulation-by-negotia-
tion is that it will simply raise transaction costs by being used inappropri-
ately. Since agencies bear many of those costs themselves, however, this is
also unlikely to be a major problem in practice. Other than continuing to
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ensure that agencies adequately disclose when they use negotiated rule-
making, no further restrictions appear necessary.
The most important conclusion of our analysis is also the most general:
when agencies have a choice of means of imposing regulation, they will
choose how to do so based on their own costs and benefits. That calcula-
tion will include whether one form allows evasions of externally imposed
constraints on agency action. If Congress and the President are serious about
those constraints, they must take additional steps to ensure that agencies
do not evade them in this fashion. Although there are serious flaws in the
political process, we think that the need for political accountability of agen-
cies trumps the benefit to agencies of evading constraints when the agen-
cies decide the constraints hinder their missions.
